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Global Governance, Legal Pluralism and the
Decentered State: A Labor Law Critique of
Codes of Corporate Conduct
ADELLE BLACKETT"

INTRODUCTION

Nike running shoes, Disney toys, and clothing from the Gap: not so long
ago, these highly recognized brand-name goods were to many merely symbols
among countless others of consumerism in Western societies. Due to the
persistent, high-profile advocacy surrounding corporate self-regulatory
initiatives,' however, these names are now also stark reminders of the
complex, tangled web of multinational enterprise (MNE) activity that draws
workers from the developing world into the intricate process of cross-border

production.
Through their attention to working conditions as labor rights, labor
* Assistant Professor, Facultyof Law, McGill University. B.A. (Queen's), LL.B. & B.C.L. (McGill),
LLM. (Columbia). This article was submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of the Science of Law in the Faculty of Law, Columbia University. Earlier versions of this article
have been presented at the Inter/national Intersections Conference, University of British Columbia,
Vancouver, May 1998; and the Law and Society Annual Meeting, Aspen, June 1998. This paper has also
benefited from the support of the Academic Council on United Nations Systems & the American Society
for International Law's Summer Workshop on Globalization and Global Governance, Yale University, New
Haven, August 1998. The Author wishes to thank the participants at those events for their engaging
questions, as well as Harry Arthurs, Mark Barenberg, Lori Damrosch, Louis Henkin, David Leebron, Linda
Reif and Patricia Williams for helpful comments on earlier versions of this article.
1. Typically referred to as "codes of corporate conduct," corporate self-regulatory initiatives have also
been called "sourcing guidelines" to the extent that they are implemented by subcontractors. The infrequent
but more coordinated industry-wide attempts of MNEs to work alongside consumer groups, human rights
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and trade unions to establish common standards and monitoring
mechanisms have been labeled "voluntary monitoring initiatives." Codes of corporate conduct are described
broadly by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to mean "commitments
voluntarily made by companies, associations or other entities, which put forth standards and principles for
the conduct of business activities in the marketplace. This definition includes self-obligations and
negotiated instruments." See OECD Working Party of the Trade Committee, Codes of Corporate Conduct:
An Inventory 5, available at http://www.oecd.org/ech/index_2.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2001) (compiling
information on 233 codes of corporate conduct, 122 of which referred to fair employment and labor rights)
[hereinafter OECD Inventory). This difference in nomenclature underscores the point that the audience for
codes of corporate conduct varies, even though with respect to labor standards, all purport to regulate local
workers' employment conditions.
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advocates seek to wrest protections for workers from corporate actors. At the
same time, corporate actors, through their own codes of corporate conduct,
publicize to consumers that they are acting voluntarily to ensure that workers

in their global production chain enjoy certain rights. In both cases, these
initiatives purport to contribute to improved regulation of the workplace.
In this Article, I posit that these initiatives are themselves emerging forms
of labor regulation. I contend that as self-regulatory initiatives, they can best
be understood through the lens of two key discourses: legal pluralism and
economic globalization. These discourses cast light upon the specific nature
of labor law, the limits to state regulatory action, and the ability of codes of

corporate conduct to adapt to the logic of the new international division of
labor.
Part I draws attention to the particular places in which corporate selfregulatory initiatives are concentrated, export processing zones (EPZs), in
order to contextualize the inquiry. That inquiry is followed by a brief critical
overview of selected contemporary examples of codes, meant to illustrate
some of their shortcomings, particularly when applied to the EPZ context. Part
II focuses on legal pluralism as it applies to traditional labor regulation, paying
attention to the underlying goals of labor law. I hold the new forms of labor
regulation up to the light of labor law's goals, and argue that, in their current
conception, they fail to meet those goals. In Part IlI, I further contend that
workers' rights advocacy surrounding self-regulatory initiatives
simultaneously understands, problematizes, and reinforces dominant
conceptions of the globalization process. After assessing some of the very real
limits faced by States in the development process, I suggest that the most
fruitful contribution of self-regulatory initiatives might be to shine a spotlight
on the complex contexts in which MNEs act, including the regulatory contexts.
The initiatives also hold the potential to foster deeper cross-border interactions
between a range of non-governmental actors. Finally, Part IV turns attention
to counter-hegemonic approaches to legal pluralism and economic
globalization, which focus on decentering the State nationally and
transnationally. In its attention to issues of representation and democratic
governance, an approach that decenters the State raises further legitimacy
questions of self-regulatory initiatives. However, the approach also provides
the starting point for more inclusive, layered forms of labor regulation across
different governance levels.
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I. SELF-REGULATORY INITIATIVES IN CONTEXT 2
A. The Importance ofPlace: MNEs in EPZs
This Section examines the role that place plays in discussions of possible
regulatory action concerning the MNE production process. I argue that place
is a key element to understanding the significance of the rise in corporate selfregulatory initiatives. I consider the significance of the observation that
corporate self-regulatory initiatives tend to apply where certain governmental
regulations-notably in the labor field, and often concerning freedom of
association-legally do not apply, or systematically are not enforced: in
EPZs.3 This observation is a reminder that new forms of regulation4 are
2. Several recent, extensive overviews of codes of corporate conduct have been prepared by key
international organizations. Two noteworthy examples are the OECD Inventory, supra note 1,and
International Labour Organization (ILO) Governing Body Party on the Social Dimensions of the
Liberalization of International Trade, Overview of global developments and office activities concerning
codes of conduct, social labelling and other private sector initiatives addressing labor issues, at
httpJ/www.ilo.org/public/ english/ standards/ ren/gb/docs/gb273/sdl.1.htm (Nov. 1998). See also
Multinational Enterprises and the Social Challenges of the X'tst Century: The ILO Declaration on
Fundamental Principlesat Work: Publicand Private CorporateCodes ofConduct,in 37 BuLL. COMP. LAB.
RE. (Roger Blanpain ed., 2000) [hereinafter Blanpain l .
3. The ILO and the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) have helpfully
defined an EPZ as a "clearly delineated industrial estate, which constitutes a free trade enclave in the
customs and trade regime of a country, and where foreign manufacturing firms producing mainly for export
benefit from a certain number of fiscal and financial incentives." See ILA & UNCTC, Economic and Social
Effects of Multinational Enterprises in Export Processing Zones, at 4 (Geneva: ILA. 1988). Most frequently,
these zones provide tax havens to corporations that invest, but other forms of "favorable" re-regulation are
prevalent. In some zones, certain labor laws (frequently on freedom of association and the right to bargain

collectively) do not apply or are restricted in part ( e.g., prohibitions on the right to strike). See ILO,
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: GENERAL SURVEY 29-30,74 (1994). In others,
labor law is systematically not enforced. Consider, for example, Tijuana or other maquiladoras along the
northern Mexican border, which is the subject of a recent North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
(NAALC) complaint, on the grounds that women are routinely discriminated against based on pregnancy.
See SUBMISSION CONCERNING PREGNANCY-BASED DISCRIMINATION IN MEXICO'S MAQUILADORA SECTOR
TO THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE [hereinafter USNAO Discrimination Report],
available at www.dol.gov/dol/ilab/public/media/reports/nao/Sub9701.htrn;
U.S. NATIONAL
ADMNisTRATIVE OFFICE ET AL., PUBLC REPORT OF RE iEW ON SUBMISSION 9701, (last visited Apr. 12,
2001),. at http://www.dol.gov/dol/ilab/ public/media/reports/nao/pubrep9701.htm. See also Ana Teresa
Romero, Export ProcessingZones in Africa: Implicationsfor Labour,2 COMPETITION & CHANGE: J.GLOB.
Bus. & Pour. ECON. 391,399-405 (1998).
4. See SASKiA SASSEN, GLoBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 97 (1998) [hereinafter SASSEN,
DISCONTENTS] (observing that a range of legal innovations and changes are often summarized under the
notion of "deregulation," but contending that "It]here is a more specific process contained in these changes,
one that along with the reconfiguration of territory may signal a more fundamental transformation"). That
process is the privatization of transnational legal regimes. Sassen points to international commercial
arbitration as one key example of this phenomenon. Id. at 98.
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emerging in newly created places. Their development is not neutral, nor is it
coincidental. Moreover, they are a reminder of globalization's fundamentally
asymmetrical nature.
Saskia Sassen has developed a rich analysis of place and
placeboundedness. Her analysis focuses on a particular type of place, which
she has referred to as "global cities." Through the lens of the global city,

Sassen is able to analyze the "underside of globalization," notably in relation
to the international financial complex. Her analysis suggests that cities are
necessary, even to industries otherwise typically considered to defy place.
This insight opens possibilities for future regulatory action.'
The analysis in this Section is complementary to that of Sassen's, but
considers that the focus on the centers that are "global cities" based principally
in nation states of the North is itself only a partial account, notably in relation
to MNE production processes. Instead it draws attention to the globalization
of regions often considered to be on the periphery' of particular developing
countries, through the state construction of EPZs. The periphery is a key
element of globalization's asymmetries.
Host countries create EPZs through special re-regulatory laws in order to
attract MNEs, whose activities are expected to spur economic development.
A tangible contribution of the MNEs, which often boast annual revenues that
exceed the GNP of the countries in which they do business, 7 is the foreign
investment that they provide. However, the contribution via taxation is often
reduced through fiscal incentives to attract foreign direct investment.8 In
5. Id. at 202-04.
6. The center-periphery distinction was an important component to the various versions of
dependency theory explaining the underdevelopment of newly emergent Third World nation States. A fresh
look at dependency theory in analyses of EPZs in economic globalization might yield fruitful outcomes.
Consider in particular the work of Samir Amin, who looked at underdevelopment from what can be
considered a "global" perspective. See generally Samir Amin, Accumulation and Development: A
Theoretical Model, 1 REvIEw OF AFRICAN PoLIcAL ECONOMY (1972). For a discussion of the different
currents of dependency theory, see MAGNUS BLOMSTROM & BA6RN HETTNE, DEVELOPMENT THEORY IN
TRANSITION: THE DEPENDENCY DEBATE & BEYOND: THIRD WORLD RESPONSES (1984).
7. See PAUL HIRST & GRAHAME THOMPSON, GLOBALIZATION INQUESTION: THE INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMY AND THE POSSIBILITIES OF GOVERNANCE (1996). See also Robert O'Brien, Commentary: LaborRelated Codes of Conduct (hereinafter O'Brien, Commentary], in CODES OF CONDUCT FOR PARTNERSHIP
IN GOVERNANCE: TEXTS AND COMMENTAIES 160 (ratsuro Kunugi & Martha Schweitz eds., 1999)
[hereinafter PARTNERSHIP INGOVERNANCE] ("Many developing states are too desperate for investment to
demand fair labor practices of MNCs or their local subcontractors. Indeed, many states have created export

processing zones to attract such activity.").
8. See iLO Governing Body, Subcommittee on Multinational Enterprises, GB.280/MNE/I/l, 280th
Session, Geneva, Mar. 2001 (Part I) at 76, 1j124, availableat http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/
relm/gb/obcs/gb280/mne-l-l.htm (last visited May 8,2001) [hereinafter Seventh MNE Declaration Survey]
(noting that concessions may include exemptions from taxes on profits for limited periods of time).
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addition, MNEs may create backward and forward linkages with local
industry,9 particularly to the extent that they draw on locally-produced goods
in their production processes. There may also be some transfer of technology
and expertise. Essentially, however, the contribution flows through the
workers. The workers are often young women ° who have migrated from rural
areas to find opportunities in the wage economy. They invariably redistribute
their wages" to family members throughout the country. 2 Ultimately, the
contribution to the host company is not the product itself, as the product is
meant for export.
Although they travel across national borders to territories within the host
country's legal jurisdiction, MNEs generally concentrate their offshore
activities in zones that are specifically created in developing or transition
economies to facilitate the export of the MNEs' products. Workers in EPZs
are thrust into the post-modem system of just-in-time flexible accumulation 3
as they enter the deterritorialized legal order of the MNEs,'" living and
producing by their norms. Yet, they do so in particular places that may harken

back to the Dickensian conditions of nineteenth-century industrialization."
Corporate self-regulatory schemes perfectly fit the EPZ model. Logically,
an enterprise that establishes itself in an EPZ would seek to avoid entangling
9. The extent of these linkages is contested. See Economic and Social Council, Commission on
Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Fortyseventh session, Item 8 of the provisional agenda, The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
The Relationship between the enjoyment of human rights, in particular, international labor and trade union
rights, and the working methods and activities of transnational corporations, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/lI! (July
24, 1995), at 49, available at http://www.unhdnr.ch/huridocdat (last visited May 31, 2001) [hereinafter
ECOSOC]. See also Ruth Buchanan, Border Crossings: NAFTA, RegulatoryRestructuring,and the Politics
ofPlace, 2 IND. J.GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 371, 389 (1995) (noting the absence of backwards supply linkages
between maquilas and domestic Mexican industry).
10. See generally ANNETTE FUENTEs & BARBARA EHRENRFECH, WOMEN INTHE GLOBAL FACTORY
(1992). See also ECOSOC, supra note 9, at 61.
11. Although wages tend to be higher in EPZs than in other areas of the local economy, working
conditions may be worse. The long term impact of these conditions should be crucial elements in any
analysis of the benefits of EPZs to developing and transition economies.
12. However, the broader social cost of those wages is not always told. See ECOSOC, supra note 9,
at I 61-62. See, e.g.,USNAO Discrimination Report, supranote 3 (Mexico, concurring).
13. See DAviD HARVEY, THE CONDITON OF POsTMODERNITY: AN ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINS OF
CULTURAL CHANGE 141-72 (1989) (analyzing the shift from Fordism to flexible accumulation and
emphasizing the importance of space and time to an understanding of this shift).

14. See Jean-Phillippe Robe, MultinationalEnterprises:The Constitution of a PluralisticLegal Order
[hereinafter Robe, MultinationalEnterprises],in GLOBAL LAw WrmOtrrA STATE 45,49 (Guenther Teubner

ed., 1997)[hereinafter GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE].
15. See HARvEY, supra note 13, at 187 (noting how under a system of flexible accumulation, labor
practices are particularly eclectic, and the paternalistic labor systems (like sweatshops and informal sector
production) that Marx assumed would not survive under advanced capitalism have re-emerged).
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itself in a web of local regulation and enforcement. Indeed, the simplified,
"deregulated" nature of these zones is meant to attract MNEs. This is not to
suggest that all host countries explicitly exclude EPZs from the scope of all
national labor legislation, although the tendency certainly has been noted. 6
But the poor enforcement that may prevail throughout the host country is nonexistent within EPZs. EPZs are generally operated by EPZ Authorities housed
in Ministries of Trade or Foreign Affairs, outside of the purview of
comparatively weak Ministries of Labor. Physical access to EPZs is also
frequently restricted, prohibiting access not only to trade unions, but also to
Labor Ministry officials, including their labor inspectors. In a report to the
ILO, a Turkish workers' organization captured the EPZ experience as "another
1
country in the country.' 1

The cumulative result of MNEs in many EPZs is the de facto deregulation
of labor relations in these zones.
In its place, a new form of
legality-corporate self-regulation via the product-is proffered.' In this
regard, EPZs crystallize the product/production process dichotomy so typical
of the new international division of labor, and are intimately linked to the
development of transnational consumerism through trade, 9 which is at the core
of corporate self-regulatory schemes.
B. A CriticalReview of Selected Recent Self-Regulatory Initiativeson
LaborRights
Although codes of corporate conduct have proliferated in recent years,
they have a lengthy, cyclical history,"0 which suggested early on the limits of
16. See ECOSOC, supra note 9, at I 64, 65. For a good overview of the impact of labor regulation
in EP7Zs in Central America and the Dominican Republic, see ILO, LA SrTuAcioN SOCIOLABoRAL EN LAS
ZONAS FRANCAS YEMPRESAS MAQUILADORAS DEL ISTMo CENmTOAMERICANO YRtpUBLICA DoMIN1CANA

21-37 (1996).
17. See Seventh MNE Declaration Survey, supra note 8,at 94,1 152.
18. See discussion, infra Part 11.
19. In fact, the product-process distinction recalls the controversy before the precursor to the World
Trade Organization, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994), over the trade in tuna that
was not considered dolphin friendly. The first dispute resolution panel distinguished between the product,
which it considered to be the proper inquiry for the purposes of the GAT, and the process, which it
considered irrelevant. Subsequent dispute resolution bodies under the World Trade Organization's dispute
resolution procedures have moved away from the distinction. See Adelle Blackett, Whither Social Clause?
Human Rights, Trade Theory and Treaty Interpretation,31 COLUM. HM. RTS. L REV. 1, 56-60 (1999).
20. See generally PARTNERSHIP rN GovEmNmNcE, supra note 7. See also Gijsbert Van Liemt, Codes

of Conduct and InternationalSubcontracting:a "private'road towards ensuringminimum labourstandards
in export industries, in Blanpain, supra note 2, at 167, 174; Harry W. Arthurs, Private Ordering and

Workers' Rights in the Global Economy: Corporate Codes of Conduct as a Regime of Labour Market
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self-regulatory devices to secure labor rights absent enabling regulatory,
enforcement-based mechanisms. 2 Heightened contemporary concern over
Regulation, in JOANNE CONAGHAN ET AL, LABOUR LAw IN AN ERA OF GLOBALISATION (forthcoming Oxford

University Press, 2001) (noting the 17th-19th century origins of employer codes, used at the time by the
great global trading companies to regulate employee behavior). Initially considered to be mere due diligence
devices, they have also taken the form of attempts by multiple actors to regulate corporate human rights
activity transnationally. A widely cited example of the due diligence use of codes of conduct is their
operation in connection with the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 175. This legislative action induced
many corporations to prepare internal codes of conduct. By serving as indicators that corporate action had
been taken to address potential problems, those codes then had the effect of reducing sentences. See Van
Liemt, in Blanpain supra note 2, at 175. Another example of early codes is the International Code of
Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes, adopted in 1981 by the governing bodies of the World Health
Organization and UNICEF. It sought to curb the way that MNEs promoted their product, particularly in the
developing world. Some countries adopted the code into national law, and faced with an international
boycott of its products, one key MNE, Nestle, finally adopted the International Code in 1994. See Riva
Knit, Globalizationand Civil Society: NGO Influence in InternationalDecision-making,United Nations
Research Institute for Social Development Discussion Paper No. 83, at 44 (Geneva, April 1997).
21. The Sullivan Principles on Investment in South Africa (Sullivan Principles), originally advanced
by the late Reverend Leon Sullivan in 1978, provided an early example of the possibilities and limits in
relation to labor rights. The Principles were: non-segregation of the races in all eating, comfort and work
facilities; equal and fair employment practices for all employees; equal pay for all employees doing equal
or comparable work for the same period of time; initiation of and development of training programs that will
prepare, in substantial numbers, Blacks and other non-whites for supervisory, administrative, clerical and
technical jobs; increasing the number of Blacks and other non-whites in management and supervisory
positions; improving the quality ofemployees' lives outside the work environment in such areas as housing,
transportation, schooling, recreation and health facilities. The Principles offered useful insights into the
interplay between voluntary initiatives, local context, and state regulatory action, and provided a concrete
historical example of the potential interplay between private initiatives and state regulatory action.
The Sullivan Principles included both a voluntary code of conduct and a mandatory annual reporting
system, with accompanying grading procedures that were used to classify firms. See Rev. Leon Sullivan,
Agents for Change: The Mobilization of Multinational Companies in South Africa, 15 L & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 427 (1983). For a positive assessment of the evolution of the principles, see generally D. Reid
Weedon, Jr., The Evolution of Sullivan Principle Compliance, 57 Bus. & Soc'Y REv. 56 (1986). The
Principles were amplified over the years to prescribe a minimum wage that would be above the living wage,
to require recognition of black trade unions, and to encourage South African companies to follow equal
rights principles. See Sullivan, supra, at 427. However, the reporting system was described as "byzantine,"
see Jill Murray, CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT AND LABOUR STANDARDS at § 4.2, available at
httpJ/www.itcilo. itlenglish/actrav/teleam/globa/ilo/GUIDE/JILL HTM., and has been roundly criticized
for failing to provide adequate information to allow investment decision-making based on compliance with
the Sullivan Principles. See Karen Paul, The Inadequacyof Sullivan Reporting, 57 Bus. & SoC'Y REV. 61
(1986).
In response, in 1986, the U.S. Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA), which
required the U.S. government and U.S. companies with over twenty-five employees in South Africa to
adhere to a code of conduct based on the Sullivan Principles. However, firms that were monitored by the
Sullivan Principles were exempt from the CAAA reporting requirements. See Murray, supra, at § 4.3. One
observer concludes that adherence to the Sullivan Principles was ultimately beneficial to companies
investing in South Africa, because it was a cost.effective way to reduce public and political pressures to act
ethically. Murray notes that many of those companies actually out-performed their competitors on the Dow
Jones Industrial Average with respect to returns on equity between 1977 and 1983. See id. The fact that
by 1987 the Rev. Sullivan had decided to call for full economic sanctions to end apartheid, see Barbara A.
Frey, The Legal and Ethical Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations in the Protection of
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MNE action, coupled with the recognized limits of international initiatives2 2
like the OECD Guidelines 3 and ILO MNE Declaration' to rein in the abuses
InternationalHuman Rights, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 153, 174-75 (1997), suggested the limited ability
of self-regulatory devices to secure labor rights absent enabling regulatory, enforcement-based measures.
Nonetheless, invigorated by the recent expansion in corporate governance initiatives, Rev. Sullivan
announced in 1999 the establishment of the "Global Sullivan Principles," affiliated with the United Nations
Global Compact. See Global Sullivan Principles, at httpJ/www.globalsullivanprinciples.org (last visited
Apr. 6,2001). The initiative was devised by Sullivan himself and a group of MNEs from "three continents"
with "input and support" from "a broad group of NGOs, intergovernmental organizations, and national
governments." See generally id. Annual reporting remains a feature of the implementation structure, and
an annual meeting of supporting companies and organizations has been added. See Global Sullivan
Principles:Implementation, athttpl/www.globalsullivanprinciples.org/ itoolincludes/17429.stm (last visited
Apr. 6,2001).
22. More concerted efforts to promote social accountability through codes of corporate conduct have
taken place through three intergovernmental organizations: the abortive efforts under the United Nations
(UN),as well as the two existing, but criticized, measures under the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), and the International Labor Organization (ILO). These mechanisms reflect the
international community's ability to achieve consensus on some particularly strong, widely-accepted
principles, and to garner useful information. However, these mechanisms fail in their ability to compel
compliance in the particular places where MNEs operate.
In the 1970s, the UN embarked on a process to draft a Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations.
See Peter T. Muchlinski, 'Global Rukowina' Examined: Viewing the Multinational Enterprise as a
TransnationalLaw-making Community, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE, supranote 14, at 79, 95. The
initiative formed part of the UN's program for establishing a New International Economic Order. See
Declaration on the Establishment of the New International Economic Order, UN Doc. No. A/Res/3201 (sV!)(l974); Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of States, UN Res. 3281, UN GAOR (1974). The Group
of 77, seeking to strengthen its economic sovereignty, garnered support from the former Eastern Bloc States,
and placed the passage of an international code to control MNEs on the UN agenda. The proposed code
focused on enhancing the ability of host States to regulate MNEs and curb abuses of corporate power, and
was initially meant to be a legally binding document. United Nations Draft International Code of Conduct
on Transnational Coporations, 23 IL.M. 626 (1984). The most recent draft was completed in 1990.
Development and International Economic Cooperation: Transnational Corporations, UN E/1990/94. This
approach, however, collided with the perspective of MNE home states, which instead sought greater
freedom of investment and protection of contractual and property rights. See Muchlinski, supra, at 95. In
an attempt to influence the course of the UN initiative, the major industrialized countries developed their
own code under the auspices of the OECD. Despite twelve years of negotiations, issues linked to the
enforceable, binding nature of the UN code, notably the role of international law, dispute settlement, and
compensation for expropriation, remained unresolved. See id.
at 96. The code was never adopted. A recent
initiative to revive the binding code approach is emerging at the UN,under the Commissioner of Human
Rights, although the authors leave open the possibility that it could be voluntary, and enforcement
mechanisms remain undeveloped. See UN Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights,
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Fifty-Second Session, Item 4 of the
Provisional Agenda, Sessional Working Group on the Working Methods and Activities of Transnational
Corporations, Principles Relating to the Human Rights Conduct of Companies: Working Paper, prepared
by David Weissbrodt, May 25, 2000, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/WG.2/WP.I, available at
http:www.unhcr.ch/huridocda (last visited May 8, 2001).
23. The OECD adopted Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises in 1976, setting out voluntary
standards covering a broad range of topics beyond the labor domain. OECD, Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises, Annex to the Declaration of June 21, 1976 by Governments of OECD Member Countries
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, available at http://www.oecd.org/
/daf/investments/guidelines/decision.html (last visited June 27, 2000) [hereinafter OECD Guidelines]. The
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Guidelines have recently been revised. OECD, OECD Declaration on International Investment and
Multinational Enterprises, at http'J/www.oecd.org//daf/investnent/guidelines/mnetext.htin (last visited May
8, 2001) [hereinafter OECD Revised Guidelines]. These revisions take into account the fact that "since
operations of MNEs extend throughout the world, international co-operation on issues relating to the
Declaration should extend to all countries." OECD, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,
Decision of the Council, at http://www.oecd.org//daf/investnent/guidelines/mnetext.htm (last visited May
22, 2001) (repealing the Second Revised Decision of the Council of June 1984 [C(84)90], amended June
1991 [C/MIN(91 )7/
ANN 1]) [hereinafter OECD Decision]. The Guidelines rely heavily on the development
by MNEs of self-regulatory initiatives. See OECD, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Review
2000, Commentary, at http://www.oecd.org//daf/investment/guidelines/mnetext.htm (last visited May 22,
2001) [hereinafter OECD Commentary]. The Guidelines call on MNEs to "[r]efrain from seeking or
accepting exemptions not contemplated in the statutory or regulatory framework" related to a range of
issues, including "labour" and "financial incentives." See OECD Revised Guidelines, supra, Part 1, 5.
In addition, they call on MNEs to "develop and apply effective self-regulatory practices and management
systems." Id. at Part 11,7. The statement that the Guidelines "should not ... be considered a substitute for
effective law and regulation by governments" is found only in the accompanying Commentary, which is not
intended to be a part of the Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises or of the
Council Decision on the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, see OECD Commentary, supra, at 11.
However, the Commentary specifies that Part IV on Employment and Industrial Relations is now modeled
broadly on the ILO's 1998 Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. See OECD Revised
Guidelines, supra, at Part IV, 1; ILO, 1998 Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
and its Follow-Up, 37 I.LM. 1233 (adopted June 18, 1998), at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/
decl/declaration/text /index.htm (last visited May 22, 2001) [hereinafter 1998 Declaration]; OECD
Commentary, supra, at 1 20. Part IV does contain some unique wording, however, such as the right to
"engage in constructive negotiations" as opposed to the standard "collective bargaining" formulation. See
OECD Revised Guidelines, supra, at Part IV, 1 1. Other labor standards are also listed, including
occupational safety and health and information disclosure. See OECD Revised Guidelines, supra, at Part
IV, 1 4 & Part V (occupational health and safety), Part Il & Part IV, 1 3 (information disclosure).
Enterprises are asked to ensure that workers are able to "consult on matters of mutual concern with
representatives of management [that] are authorized to make decisions on those matters." Id. at Part IV, at
18. This is an important inclusion in light of the not infrequent case where decision-makers are based at
headquarters in the West, far away from the local workers in the host country. However, the Guidelines
ultimately seem only to recommend that enterprises "[o]bserve standards of employment and industrial
relations not less favourable than those observed by comparable employers in the host country." Id. at Part
IV, 14, at (a).
Outside of national channels for the resolution of disputes, the Guidelines are monitored but not
enforced through the loosely tripartite OECD Committee on International Investment and Multinational
Enterprises (CLIME). See Murray, supra note 21, at § 2.2.1. The Committee on International Investment
and Multinational Enterprises can deal with matters raised by the Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC)
and the Business and Industry Committee (BIAC), which represent their constituencies in this forum, but
TUAC and BIAC have only consultative status before the Committee. See id. Committee decisions take
the form of "clarifications" to the Guidelines, which have been described by Jill Murray as showing "an
extremely cautious, even opaque, attitude to interpreting the Declaration, and answering adherence to the
principle of national treatment, and the primacy given to national systems of industrial relations and law."
See Murray, supra note 21, at § 2.2.1. For a thorough discussion of the critiques of the OECD Guidelines,
see James Salzman, Labor Rights, Globalization and Institutions: The Role and Influence of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 769, 793-96 (2000).
Murray concludes, though, by challenging the OECD's own suggestion that the Guidelines are a respected
point of reference for a great majority of MNEs. Specifically, she asserts that the limited references in the
1990s to the OECD Guidelines and the reluctance of multinationals to report on compliance with the code
in their annual reports suggest that any "general support from business for the Guidelines reflects the fact
that it does little to constrain them in any practical way." See Murray, supra note 21, at § 2.2.2. While the
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of global capital, has led to a proliferation of private sector workers' rights
initiatives, which vary tremendously.2" The differences, notably between
earlier individual company codes and more recent coordinated efforts, are
important and suggest that significant progress has been made to improve the
procedures have been modified, doubtless in response to such criticism, the changes are quite modest. The
revised procedure calls for contact points to be established in all adhering countries to promote the
Guidelines, report annually to the ClME, and assist in the "resolution of issues" linked to implementation.
See "Procedural Guidance," OECD Decision, supra. How this modified procedure will address the concerns
linked to abuses of MNE power, which tend to occur in countries that are not members of the OECD,
remains less than clear. Until addressed, the reforms will likely be perceived as highly unsatisfactory.
Attention to the places where MNE action may collide with workers' rights calls the need for more focused
compliance measures starkly into relief.
24. In 1977, the ILO adopted a Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational
Enterprises and Social Policy. See Tripartite Declaration ofPrinciples Concerning Multinational Enterprises
and Social Policy, 17 I.LM. 422, available at httpJ/www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/norm/sources/
mne.htm (last visited June 16, 2001) [hereinafter MNE Declaration]. It consists of 58 Articles and refers
to the UN resolutions advocating the Establishment of a New International Economic Order and other
initiatives by international bodies to act in the field of multinational enterprises and social policy. Recently,
it has been modified by the ILO's Governing Body to include the ILO Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work. ILO Governing Body, Follow-up and Promotion, March 2000, SubCommittee on Multinational Enterprises, GB.277/MNE/l (2000), available at
http./www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ relm/gb277/pdf/mne-3.pdf (last visited May 8, 2001). It
captures a broad range of economic and labor policies, including employment (employment promotion,
equality of opportunity and treatment, security of employment), training, conditions of work and life (wages,
benefits and conditions of work, safety and health), and industrial relations (freedom of association and the
right to organize, collective bargaining, consultation, examination of grievances, and settlement of industrial
disputes). It then seeks to apply them carefully in the particular context of local workplaces under the
control of MNEs. It is worth noting that UNCTAD has praised the MNE Declaration as a "key reference
standard" for international investment agreements that seek to address labor matters. See UNCTAD,
WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1996: INvESTMENT, TRADE & INTERNATIONAL POuCY ARRANGEMENTS 187
(1996). This is most apparent in the provisions on industrial relations. Article 52 refers to "bona fide
negotiations" and seeks specifically to preclude the use by an MNE of threats to transfer its operations to
unfairly influence negotiations or to hinder the exercise of the right to organize. See MNE Declaration,
supra, at 429. Article 57 sets out grievance principles to ensure that workers have a core of basic procedural
rights, which are "particularly important whenever the multinational enterprises operate in countries which
do not abide by the principles of ILO Conventions pertaining to freedom of association, to the right to
organise and bargain collectively and to forced labor." Id. The MNE Declaration is monitored through a
quadrennial survey to the ILO's governing body on questionnaire responses from governments, employers,
and worker's representatives. See most recently the Seventh MNE Declaration Survey, supranote 8.
Some observers have concluded that the MNE Declaration is not a tool to remedy violations by MNEs
of the Declaration's principles. See Murray, supra note 21, at § 2.3.1. Most significantly, even the ILO's
working party, which wrote the Seventh MNE Declaration Survey, "quer[ied] the effectiveness of the
application of the MNE Declaration in EPZs/SEZs and recommend[ed] exploration of further means for
promotion of its principles in such settings." See Seventh MNE Declaration Survey, supranote 8, at 112,
203. Indeed, certain member States have called for reforms, including the establishment of a functioning
observatory and investigatory body that signals abuses by MNEs. See id.at 101,
166 (Belgian
governmental proposal).
25. A particularly helpful recent resource on codes of corporate conduct and research on these
initiatives is the ILO's Business and Social Initiatives Database (BASI), at httpJ/oracle02.ilo.org:
6060/upi/vpisearch.first (last visited May 8, 2001).
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effectiveness of private initiatives. Despite these ameliorations, however, the
fundamental tensions between codes and the local regulatory environment
remain strong.
1. Individual Company Codes

In their initial, and still common current form, individual company codes
of corporate conduct remain short documents reminiscent of due diligence
instruments, issued by head offices of MNEs and containing vague assertions
that local labor standards will be respected.' Unlike the intergovernmental
models, these codes tend not to refer to freedom of association and the right
to bargain collectively, even as it may be recognized locally." Indeed, they do
not generally refer to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work,28 or to the specific fundamental labor standards that embody
those principles and rights: ' Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 on freedom of
association and the right to bargain collectively,30 Nos. 29 and 105 on forced
labor,3 Nos. 100 and 111 on non-discrimination and equality of treatment,32
and Nos. 138 and 182 on child labor.33 Basic issues, like translation of
26. See OECD Inventory, supra note 1,at 16. The OECD Inventory underlines the particular difficulty
attached to identifying whether codes are in operation or have been modified, as many code texts do not
specify a date of entry into force. Id. at 8. See also Van Liemt, in Blanpa, supra note 2, at 181-83.
27. Chris Engels points out some rather striking examples of this important omission. See Chris
Engels, Codes of Conduct: Freedom ofassociationand the rightto bargaincollectively, in Blanpain.supra
note 2, at 207, 220-31.
28. See 1998 Declaration, supra note 23.
29. For an overview of these principles and rights at work, see Blackett, supra note 19, at 13-34.
30. See Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize,
adopted July 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17 (No. 87), available at http://ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/scripts/
convde.pl?query=C87& query0=C87&submit"Display (last visited June 16,200 1); Convention Concerning
Application of Principles of Right to Organize and to Bargain Collectively, adopted July 1, 1949, 96
=
U.N.T.S. 257 (No. 98), available at http'/ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/scripts/convde.pl?query-C98&queryO
C98&submit=Display (last visited June 16, 2001).
31. See Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, adopted June 28, 1930,39 U.N.T.S.
55 (No. 29), available at http://ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/scripts/convde.pl?query--C29&queryO=
C29&submit=Display (last visited June 16, 2001); Convention Concerning Abolition of Forced Labour,
adoptedJune 25, 1957,320 U.N.T.S. 291 (No. 105), availableathttp://ilolex.ilo.ch: 1567/scripts/convde.pl?
query-C 105&query0 = C 105&submit=-Display (last visited June 16, 2001).
32. See Convention Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal
Value, adopted June 29, 1951. 165 U.N.T.S. 303 (No. 100), available at
http'/ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/scripts/convde.pl? query=CIOO&query0=Cl00&submit=Display (last visited June
16,2001); Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, adoptedJune
25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31 (No. Ill), available at httpJ/ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/scripts/convde.pl?
query=C I I &queryO=Cl I l&submit=Display (last visited June 16,2001).
33. See The Minimum Age Convention, adopted June 26, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 297 (No. 138),
available at httpJ/ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/scripts/convde.pl?query=C 38&queryO=C138&submit--Display (last
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documents or the institution of clear time horizons for particular actions, are
often overlooked.' Few such codes contain dispute resolution mechanisms or
provisions for "independent monitoring."" According to a particularly
36
comprehensive study, none provides for host government involvement.
Codes of corporate conduct apply generally to the workers in companies
with transnational involvement; few differentiate between individual countries
or contemplate those countries' specificities.37 Tellingly, the differences
between individual codes of corporate conduct seem more accurately to mirror
the sensibilities of the various national audiences of consumers to whom the
products are targeted, even at the risk that different MNEs that subcontract to
the same local firm will seek to regulate the workers' conditions of
employment differently. The regulatory link is the product, rather than the
worker or the workplace.

visited June 16,2001); The Convention Concerning Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination
of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, adopted June 17, 1999, 38 l.L.M. 1207 (No. 182), available at
http://ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/scripts/convde.pl?query-=C82&query0=Cl82&submit=Display (last visited June
16, 2001). According to the OECD Inventory, only 18% of the codes surveyed referred to one or more
international standards. Those international standards most often cited were ILO Conventions and UN
Declarations, although the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises was used as a reference in one
code. OECD Inventory, supra note l, at 16. See also Van Liemt, in Blanpain, supra note 2, at 18 1.
34. See Ans Kolk, International Codes of Conduct and Corporate Social Responsibility: Can
TransnationalCorporations Regulate Themselves?, 8 TRANSNAT'L CORP. 143, 163 (1999) (noting that only
fourteen percent of the 132 codes contain a clear time horizon).
35.
[A] significant number of company and business association codes included in the
inventory do not touch on the subject of monitoring at all. Where company codes
have relevant provisions, almost all state that in-house staff will oversee
implementation of and compliance with the code's standards-both by the company
that issues the code and by its suppliers and other business partners. In other words,
companies tend to prefer internal procedures or remain silent on this issue.
OECD Inventory, supra note I, at 17. Consider, though, that on April 20, 1998, suit was brought before the
Superior Court of California, claiming that Nike has violated the California Unfair Business Practices Act,
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (Deering 2001), by making misrepresentations by the use of false
statements and material omissions about a range of working conditions to maintain and/or increase its sales.
Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 854, 857 (Cal. Ct. App.), review granted and superceded by 2 P.3d
1065 (Cal. 2000).
36. See OECD Inventory, supra note 1,at 19, para. 57.
37.
[A] large majority of the codes apply to the direct employees of the company or
companies concerned. The survey also finds that when companies set standards for
the direct employees, these usually apply to the global operations of the company.
In only one instance did a company differentiate between countries, having
developed two different codes, one applicable to its activities carried out in the
United States and one for its operations in the rest of the world.... A significant
number of codes extend to the employees of contractors (and sub-contractors].
Id. at 15.
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2. CoordinatedInitiatives
Despite these daunting initial difficulties with individual codes, coalitions
of civil society and business groups-with or without some governmental
input-have attempted to craft more coordinated mechanisms to respond
sensibly to the challenges of regulating labor standards across borders and
across many different MNE contracting agreements.3" These initiatives
suggest that there has been serious development over time in the analysis of
how to address the complexities of labor regulation in workplaces across
borders.39 However, none escapes the paradox of regulating via the product
38. A prominent contemporary example of codes of corporate conduct in their more coordinated form
originated with the White House Task Force, known initially by its sectoral focus as the Apparel Industry
Partnership (AlP), which has led to the formation of the Fair Labor Association (FLA). The AP was formed
in 1996 after a nudge from U.S. President Bill Clinton and Secretary of Labor Robert Reich in the wake of
the widespread public concern over conditions in the overseas factories of popular U.S. brand name apparel
manufacturers. An initial presidential photo-opportunity meeting of industry and labor representatives and
prominent NGOs led to a regular series of working meetings to craft industry standards on issues such as
forced labor, child labor, harassment, and freedom of association. It sought to build in an industry-wide
consensus not only on certain standards, but also on the monitoring of those standards. After two years of
meetings between industry representatives, U.S. trade unions and NGOs, during which time some companies
defected, an agreement was reached. Karen Kane is 2nd Company to Quit Anti-Sweatshop Unit, WOMENS'
WEAR DAILY, June 20, 1997, at 14 (noting that the Warnaco Group decided to leave in April 1997, and that
Karen Kane Inc. "took issue with the panel's approach for keeping tabs on the myriad factories and
contractors worldwide that produce garments and shoes for the U.S. market"). The Agreement included the
FLA, which would implement and monitor the code of conduct. For a brief discussion of the AIP/FLA, see
Justine Nolan & Michael Posner, InternationalStandards to Promote Labor Rights: The Role ofthe United
States Government, 2000 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 529, 539-541 (2000). However, the major trade unions,
notably UNITE, and several key NGOs, including the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility,
disassociated themselves from the agreement, dealing a severe blow to the legitimacy of the final text.
Steven Greenhouse, Two More Unions Reject Agreement for Curtailing Sweatshops, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 6,
1998, at A 15. One example of the legitimacy challenge came in the fall of 1998. Suppliers of university
apparel proposed codes of conduct that mirrored the AlP code of conduct. However, students protested on
the grounds that the AIP did not contain provisions for a living wage and did not have adequate provision
to enable the codes to be monitored on site. See O'Brien, Commentary, supra note 7, at 161. It has been
observed that "the result is a code short of broad support and of questionable utility." Id. at 162.
The reasons for the fallout predictably surrounded three key issues: the absence of living wage
provisions, the failure to encourage companies to support the right to organize and bargain collectively, and
the absence of truly independent monitoring. See id. at 161. The rift between the trade unions who refused
to support the final code and the NGOs that remained in the partnership underscored key differences
between those groups, and brought into relief the importance of considering questions of agency, identity
and democratic participation in the framework of corporate self-regulatory initiatives that affect the
workplace. See discussion infra, Part IV.
39. A particularly compelling recent example of this progress is the Workers Rights Consortium
(WRC). This robust initiative was launched in 2000 by the United Students Against Sweatshops in
consultation with workers and human rights groups, with the aim to provide an alternative to companycontrolled monitoring. Targeted to university-licensed procurements, it has already garnered the affiliation
of 76 colleges and universities; these schools fund the WRC via either a percentage of licensing revenues
or annual dues. See http.//www.workersrights.org/memberschools.htm. (last visited May 31, 2001);
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Bylaws of the Workers Rights Consortium, Annex 1, Key WRC Principles, available at
http: /twww.workersrights.org. (last visited May 31, 2001). The WRC seems largely consistent with the
theoretical insights of Charles Sabel, Dara O'Rourke and Archon Fung in Ratcheting Labor Standards:
Regulation for Continuous Improvement in the Global Workplace, John F.Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University Faculty Research Working Papers Series, KSG Working Paper No. 00-010 & Columbia
Law School, The Center for Law and Economic Studies, Working Paper No. 185, available at
http'//papers.ssm.com/paper.tafabsactid =253833 (last visited May 31, 2001).
The WRC's proposed Code of Conduct tackles tricky but important questions like the meaning of a
living wage; surprisingly, though, in some areas where internationally recognized 110 standards exist, the
WRC appears only loosely to be based on them and does not appear to address the worst forms of child
labor. In one case, it refers specifically to compliance with U.S. law on occupational safety and health. See
Workers Rights Consortium Code of Conduct, §§ 4 (child labor) and 6 (health and safety) respectively,
availableat http'/www.workersrights.org (last visited May 31, 2001).
The WRC is wisely tailored to avoid several common pitfalls of other code initiatives. First, it avoids
certifying that companies are in compliance; rather, it uses the vehicle of the licensing agreement between
universities and suppliers to hold the licensee accountable for violations of the relevant code of conduct.
Although the WRC initiative relies on the spotlight effect to promote change of abusive conditions, it
requires the licensee to assume an obligation to use its leverage to correct problems at the problematic
worksite, rather than merely exercising its exit option, a thorough verification system. That verification
system relies on several mechanisms including public disclosure, spot investigatory capacity, and the use
of the licensing agreement as leverage. Attention has also been given to the characteristics and
qualifications of the evaluators, drawing in particular on university resources. This enables it to maintain
its credibility and essentially to hold its affiliates, the universities, to act responsibly in the face of verified
violations. Second, it has strong academic representation; indeed, the tight link to universities gives it a
built-in supportive constituency and a level of legitimacy that could not as easily be garnered in other
sectors. It has also garnered greater participation through its advisory council than many code initiatives
from trade unions in producing countries. See http://www.workersrights.org/governance.html (last visited
May 3i,2001). Third, its verification procedures are considerably more robust than most, thereby avoiding
some of the pitfalls that at the outset undermine verification efforts. Continual reevaluation, notably of
verification procedures, is also built into the initiative. See WRC Investigative Protocols, available at
http://www.workersrights.org. (last visited May 31, 2001). For these important reasons, the WRC is a clear
example of solid progress in the development of workers rights advocacy initiatives, reminicient of some
of the more robust European coordinated initiatives, like the Clean Clothes Campaign. See
http://www.cleanclothes.org (last visited May 31, 2001).
However, the WRC initiative, because it is based on the management-ordering code of corporate
conduct model, is ultimately unable to avoid some of the critiques that are central to this analysis, and
discussed in greater detail infra at Parts IIand III. First, the WRC initiative does not grapple with the
potential role of the State in regulating labor conditions, particularly in places like EPZs. Indeed, on the
issue of freedom of association and collective bargaining, the WRC's code of conduct mentions the State
only to clarify that licensees "shall not cooperate with governmental agencies and other organizations that
use the power of the State to prevent workers from organizing a union of their choice." See Workers Rights
Consortium Code of Conduct, § 9, available at httpl/www.workersrights.org (last visited May 31, 2001).
No attention is given to the potential facilitative role that governments can be enabled to play, in order to
promote freedom of association and the right to bargain collectively. The initiative focuses instead on
accentuating unannounced spot investigations in countries and regions where workers rights are suppressed,
with the expectation that MNEs will seek to change their labor and sourcing practices comprehensively to
ensure compliance.
Second, although the WRC has a model code, each individual affiliated university retains the ability
to establish its own code; this, coupled with the plethora of other existing codes of corporate conduct for
non-WRC affiliated purchasers, can lead to individual plants producing according to different standards,
depending on where each product is destined. It is not clear how the goal of promoting comprehensive
MNE management codes could be realized, and even whether it would be desirable, given the variations that
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to ensure that labor is not commodified.
It is useful to pause to consider a rather thorough attempt to self-regulate,
which poignantly illustrates this paradox: Social Accountability International's
(SAI) 4° SA8000 code. The 1997 initiative is modeled on a widely used set of
business certification standards established through the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO); particularly, on the quality control
standard ISO 9000. The SA8000 is one of the most rigorous voluntary codes
of conduct yet crafted. The SA8000 relies fairly heavily in some areas on the
Conventions of the ILO and other key human rights instruments. Its standards
cover child labor, forced labor, health and safety, compensation, working
hours, discrimination, discipline, freedom of association and the right to
bargain collectively, and "management systems."42 Yet the reliance on
international standards raises its own concerns. For example, the code
contemplates that in the absence of state facilitation of matters like the
freedom of association and the right to bargain collectively, it is the company
that should essentially prevent anti-union discrimination. 3
Yet particularly on freedom of association as it applies in local EPZs
through codes of corporate conduct, the SA-8000 and other codes of corporate
conduct appear to be inelegantly grafted onto a local context with little
consideration given to how freedom of association could be meaningfully
promoted. It is difficult to imagine how employers could "recognize and
respect the right of employees to freedom of association and collective
bargaining" in EPZs where enabling state regulatory frameworks of
collective bargaining do not apply or are inoperative. Absent a general
industrial relations system that underpins the freedom of association and
ensures the effective right to bargain collectively, the panoply of principles,
ultimately arise in light of the particulars of different places of production. Indeed, central to the critique
of this paper is that the very promotion of a comprehensive MNE management code ultimately reinforces
the power of corporations to extend their unmediated power into these new workplace contexts.
40. Until the summer of 2000, this initiative was known as the Council on Economic Priorities
Accrediation Agency (CEPAA). See http//www.ccpaa.org/introduction/htm. (last visited May 31, 2001).
The advisory board for this initiative is more international than was the Apparel Industry Partnership,
although the input remains overwhelmingly from industrialized countries. See http'/www.cepaa.org/
advisoryboard.htm. (last visited May 31, 2001).
41. It is noteworthy that ISO's approach to standard setting, notably in the environmental domain, has
come under sharp criticism for its failure to include NGOs and its tardy, limited inclusion of developing
countries. See Krut, supranote 20, at 33-34.
42. See http://www.cepaa.org/saOOO.htm. (last visited May 31, 2001) [hereinafter SA8000].
43. Id. at§4.
44. Apparel Industry Partnership, Report of Apparel Industry Partnership on Workplace Code of
Conduct, at http://www.dol.gov/doesa/ublic/nosweatpartnershipreport.htm (Last visited May 14, 2001).
See also discussion supra, note 38 and accompanying text
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processes and enforcement mechanisms either disappear or are partially
recreated through piecemeal private measures. 5 Fundamentally, the selfregulatory measures leave unanswered the question of who will mediate and
regulate relations between MNEs and workers. Business self-regulation
allows footloose capital to perch high above local regulation and enforcement
channels, without disrupting trade or investment flows,' and with only the
occasional concession that "independent" monitors may become the arbiters
of whether labor-related codes of conduct are being enforced.
The management systems auditing dimension is touted as a cornerstone of
the SA8000 system," but for an observer assessing it from an industrial
relations perspective, the gulf between the "management systems" framework
and the "industrial relations" framework is stark. The SA8000 places a
premium on CEPAA's ability to certify and accredit firms (certification
bodies) to become external auditors. Those external auditors certify
manufacturing facilities for conformance to SA8000, following established
criteria for accreditation.'
Moreover, CEPAA has an ongoing process to
45. Strikingly, the SA8000 contemplates that "[t]he company shall, in those situations in which the
right of freedom of association and collective bargaining are restricted under law, facilitate parallel means
of independent and free association and bargaining for all personnel." SA8000, supra note 42, at § 4.2.
Similarly, it is significant that in their proposal of a regulatory strategy that relies on competition between
firms and consumer pressure to ratchet up labor standards, Sabel, O'Rourke, and Fung are conspicuously
silent on the freedom of association and collective bargaining rights, although they concede that "organized
workplaces might prove to be the most capable social monitors and agents of continuous improvement."
See Sabel et al, supra note 39, at 35.
46. See OECD Inventory, supra note I, at 4 (noting that issues addressed through codes of corporate
conduct rely mainly on non-governmental bodies in ways that seek to entail little direct impact on trade or
investment flows).
47. See CEPAA, Comments and Corrections Regarding the SA8000 System: A Response to the June
1999 Laric Report on sa8000, at http://www.cepaa.org/Documents/ResponsetoLARIC.doc.
48. External monitors must:
*
Pass the SA8000 lead auditor training course;
*
Be registered with a recognized international accreditation body, e.g., Rab or
IRCA;
*
Be trained on audits by their employer and approved prior to advancing to a
"lead" position, which is authorized to conduct the audit;
•
Have the appropriate language skills;
*
Have a subject matter expert available determined by the nature of the industry,
*
Be knowledgeable of local customs and practices (preferably living and
working in the area);
*
Research local laws and health, safety regulations before performing the
audit(s);
*
Communicate with local NGOs and trade unions to obtain "real" information
about the facility prior to the audit to sensitize them to possibly intimidating
conditions;
*
And, above all, they are subject to periodic review by the agency to assure that
the auditor has the necessary skills and that the job was done correctly.
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monitor the certification bodies."' Not only do accredited certification bodies
prepare a report; they also issue a statement of "conformance" or "nonconformance," with a view to certification.5" An important dimension of the
standard is that certification is not issued to MNEs as such, but to individual
plants.5 Consequently, compliance guarantees are locally based.
SAI's model reflects a classic management systems framework. Its focus
is not unlike that adopted to ensure that there is a level of quality control of a
"product" in the production process. In other words, standards are put in place
to ensure that production runs smoothly and efficiently, from a management
perspective. SAI also seems prepared to be reflective about its process in the
making, and has embarked on a consultative review in 2000.52 The
problematic aspect of this framework is that in the labor relations context, the
underlying considerations justifying labor regulation are outside of-and to a
limited extent in conflict with-the management systems framework. As will
be discussed in Parts II and III, from a labor relations perspective, the
adaptation of an approach that has been applied to "product" justifiably elicits
skepticism when it is applied to working "people" in their relationship with
management in the production "process" in particular places, like EPZs.
Id.

49. CEPAA has summarized the criteria as follows:
*
Adheres to ISO/IEC Guide 62.
*
Obtains and maintains information about working conditions from regional
interested parties, NGOs, and workers and how such information is

*
*

*

incorporated in the plans for initial audits, surveillance, and re-certification
audits.
Determines the sufficient wage level, per SAg000, 8.1,
and the Guidance
thereto.
Ascertains and records, prior to accepting a client, the languages spoken by
personnel at the facility, and the proportion speaking each.
Maintains client files documenting the above information and uses the abovementioned information in the audit process.
Ensures audit personnel are trained in the components and application of
SA8000 procedures for selecting a qualified team of auditors.
Obtains factual information in a manner sensitive to local cultural norms, and

ensures that any audit team can so conduct employee interviews and protect the
confidentiality of workers who are interviewed.

*

Ensures auditor possession of appropriate local language and interview skills
and/or that any subcontractor, auditor or translator engaged in the audit is

impartial, including that he or she is not an employee or recent ex employee of
the auditee.
Id. See also http://www.cepaa/org/accreditation-criteria.htm. (last visited May31, 2001).
50. Id.
51. Id. See also SA800 Certified Facilities (as of April 2001), at http://www.cepaa.org/
certification.html. (last visited May 31, 2001).
52. See http'//www.cepaa.org/saOOOreview.htm. (last visited May 31,2001).
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I. LEGAL PLURALISM AND THE SPECIFICITY OF LABOR REGULATION
A. The Specificity of Labor Regulation
Corporate self-regulatory initiatives reflect the perception that in an
increasingly interdependent economy, it is desirable (for protectionist or moral
reasons) to control the conditions under which imported goods are produced.
At least from the moral perspective, workers' rights advocacy strengthens the
increasingly prevalent claim that it would be better not to have production at
all than to produce under conditions that lead to the systematic violation of a
limited set of fundamental human rights. This approach has translated into
attempts to establish effective labor conditions wherever there is some link
between the worker and the final consumer product. However, by focusing
on the "product," codes of corporate conduct tend to treat labor conditions in
a manner that parallels other production processes, like those relating to the
environment."3 Codes of corporate conduct are viewed simply on an
administrative level, as regulatory links that connect workplace conditions to
the global production chain.
In fact, however, labor is different. At a basic level, this is because labor
is about people. Through the "productive" process, people enter the market
system in their capacity as a factor of production. However, their subordinated
participation is expected to be other than that of a commodity merely bought
and sold in relation to supply and demand. Labor law therefore mediates their
access, infusing it with the dignity that the market alone cannot provide. To
the extent, then, that labor law is where the role of market ordering and public
policy is traditionally mediated,' 4 the hard question for labor law, in light of
changes in production and trade patterns, becomes the relative role of labor
regulation in a transnational context.
The dual purpose of labor law is to provide worker protection and worker
agency through democratic participation." Under traditional industrial
53. This is not to suggest, however, that representation is unimportant in other issue areas; rather, the
argument here rests on the specificity of the labor relationship and why it warrants a particular form of
representation.
54. See Brian A. Langille, General Reflections on the Relationship of Trade and Labor (Or: Fair
Trade is Free Trade's Destiny) [hereinafter Langille, General Reflections], in FAIR TRADE AND
HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FORFREETRADE 231,243 (Jagdish N. Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds.,
1996)[hereinafter FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION].

55. See Constitution of the International Labour Organization, June 28,1919, 225 Consol. T.S. 378-39,
available at http://www.ilo.orgpublic/english/about/iloconst.htm (last visited May 31, 2001). See also
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relations theory, these purposes are accomplished by a state regulatory
framework that allows groups with divergent interests to regulate relationships
between themselves, while simultaneously establishing a floor of protective
conditions. Through collective action, independent workers' representatives
negotiate the relationship between workers and management. In this manner,
labor regulation establishes the channels that give workers "voice" through
which they can participate democratically in workplace decisions. Workers
and management can then identify and focus on convergences of interest,
while effectively negotiating, mediating, and where necessary arbitrating
differences. Yet the philosophical basis of the right to bargain collectively is
found not in trade union membership, but rather in workers' subordination to
management through the employment relationship.' For the collective
bargaining relationship to retain its validity, it must therefore respect certain
basic balances between management and worker rights," often delineated in
protective legislation. 8
Corporate self-regulatory initiatives change the delivery of both key labor
regulatory principles. They are typically characterized as securing the former
purpose, worker protection. They do so by articulating protective standards 9
that MNEs should ensure are implemented by enterprises directly or indirectly
involved in the production process, anywhere on the globe. However, they do
so while increasing the scope of management power, over-reaching or
supplanting state protective action required to mediate the effects of
disproportionate bargaining power (even in collective relations), and to prevent
unacceptable bargains that might be arrived at through "voluntary" collective
bargaining. 6° Furthermore, their ability to protect workers' rights through
independent monitoring is severely contested. 6
PAUL WFlLER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 226 (1990).

56. See Alain Supiot, Drdglementationdes relationsde travailet autoriglementationde I'entreprise.
3 DROIT SOCIAl. 195, 204 (Mar. 1989).
57. See id.
58. David Beatty, Ideology, Politics and Unionism, in STUDIES INLABOUR LAW 299, 321 (Kenneth

P. Swan & Katherine E.Swinton eds., 1983).
59. See generally Frey, supra note 21.

60. For a thorough discussion of the limits of traditional collective bargaining law and the need for a
protective role of the state in the law of employment, broadly understood, see Beatty, supra note 58.
61. Van Liemt's assessment is as follows:
Certain working conditions are more easily verified than others are. Adequate
lighting, the wear of protective gear, access to emergency exits, and cleanliness are
all elements that can be checked without too many problems, even by people without
specialised training. To establish the age of a child worker or the wage that is being
paid is more complex. To know whether workers are forced to work overtime, suffer
from sexual harassment or are physically abused requires a basis of trust between the
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As to the latter democratic participation role, there is a certain irony in the
fact that the move to view labor standards as human rights" through
universally-applied codes of corporate conduct has turned attention away from
some of the key insights of industrial relations that underpin the pluralism in
regulatory and enforcement powers. By diverting attention to management
monitoring systems, and away from classic voice mechanisms through labormanagement dispute settlement machinery, self-regulatory initiatives run the
risk of supplanting rather than buttressing democratic participation in the
workplace.
B. Pluralism in TraditionalIndustrialRelations Law and Tensions of the
New Paradigm
The preceding critique could be read as suggesting that state mechanisms
are necessarily preferable to the regulation of labor relations over potentially
more efficient and effective self-regulatory measures undertaken by the freely
chosen, independent representatives of both workers and employers. Yet such
a reading would miss the point that the opposition between state and private
action is hardly that stark in labor relations law and practice.63
Pluralism is an integral part of the traditional industrial relations
paradigm.' As historian Jean-Marie Fecteau explains, freedom of association
became the medium through which different civil society groups, including
workers' organizations, were permitted to self-regulate, but within the context
of a liberal legal system.6 The key liberal ideal of voluntarism was the
interviewer and the interviewee.
See Van Uemt, in Blanpain, supra note 2, at 184.
62. See generally Virginia Leary, The Paradox of Workers' Rights as Human Rights, in HUMAN
RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 22 (Lance A. Compa & Stephen F. Diamond eds.,

1996). See also Blackett, supra note 19, at 26-34.
63. The critique of the fixed-rule understanding of regulation and law proffered by Sabel et al., supra
note 39, at 5, 7-8, although sensitive to the constraints of developing countries, seems in this regard to
sidestep the central interaction of state law and private ordering in the labor relations context. The proposed
Ratcheting Labor Standards framework (which interestingly relies on the decidedly low technology
metaphor of a "ratchet wrench" in the context of economic globalization--often perceived as high tech,
despite the 19th century parallels to labor conditions) seeks to provide a fluid alternative to promote
enforceable standards, but without grappling with the interplay between these corporate focused mechanisms
and the already pluralistic labor relations model. More attention to labor relations as a system rather than
mere standards, as well as to place, would usefully complicate the ratcheting labor standards analysis.
64. See PIERRE VERGE & GUYIAINE VALLtFE UN DRorr DU TRAVAIL? ESSAI SUR LA SPIFCITI
DU DROIT DU TRAVAIL 167 (1997) (articulating the plurality of sources of labor law, notably collective
bargaining).
65. See Jean-Marie Fecteau, Du droit d'associationau droitsocial: Essaisurla crise du droit libiral
et i'dmergence d'une alternative pluraliste ii la norme itatique, 1850-1930, 12 CAN. J. L. & SoC. 143
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foundation of freedom of association, the legitimating factor of the
organizations' existence and representaivity. " Drawing on this representative
capacity, workers and employers' associations were permitted to create the law
that applied to them."7 In certain contexts, the law that they created could even
be extended by the State to cover other similarly-situated individuals.6 8 For
Fecteau, this model somewhat challenged the unitary notion of the liberal legal
system, and the coexistence of worker-created law and state law succeeded,
temporarily, because the partial trade-off in favor of a welfare-state provided
certain social rights to citizens. As eminent legal scholar Harry Arthurs
explains:
This is not to argue that collective bargaining - or any of the
other regimes - necessarily operated in total isolation from
the state. In various societies, at various times, collective
bargaining has been tolerated, encouraged, licensed,
regulated, or co-opted by the state. But the most distinctive
feature of collective bargaining is not its nexus with the state;
rather it is that collective bargaining relies upon employers
and workers to generate and enforce the norms which govern
workplace behaviour."
Both Fecteau and Arthurs contend that the unravelling of the welfare state in
a post-Keynesian era might call for this paradigm to be reconsidered.7"
A new paradigm has indeed emerged, 7 and codes of corporate conduct
may be viewed as attempts to grapple with it. At their best, the codes of
corporate conduct may permit the application and enforcement of common,
socially just rules across territorial boundaries to individual workplaces,
thereby linking plants around the world with the distant MNE and the
consuming public. This wide and tangled web is deemed necessary given the
new international division of labor, which has been described as a flexible
(1997).
66. Id. at 151 (noting that the basic rule was that the power of the association is limited to its members,
and its ability to act is also seriously restricted).
67. Id. at 155.

68. The legal decrees ("dcrets de lois") are examples of this phenomenon. See, e.g., GtIRARD LYONCAEN & JEAN PtLIsstER, DRorr DU TRAVAIL, (16th ed. 1992); JMAN-Louis DUBt, DtCRETs ET CoMITts
PARITAIRES: L'EXTENSION JURIDIQUE DES CONVENTIONS COLLECTIVES (1990).

69. Harry W. Arthurs, Labor Law Without the State?, 46 U. TOR. L J. 1, 3 (1996).
70. Fecteau, supra note 65, at 156-57; Arthurs, supra note 69, at 4.

71. For a leading account of these changes, see generally Arthurs, supra note 69.
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system of accumulation in which corporations outsource production to

different producers and component assemblers around the world.72
Codes of corporate conduct also coexist with traditional forms of labor
regulation. In an economic context in which new and old forms of production
interact,73 complement, and challenge each other, it may be acceptable, even
desirable, to adopt a layered vision of labor regulation that is responsive to
differences across and within labor law systems and relations between States.74
On an optimistic view of the interaction between old and new, codes of
corporate conduct provide a form of regulatory control that allows a broader
range of stakeholders in workplace justice (like consumers in receiving
countries) to use their leverage vis-i-vis MNEs to regulate human rights across
borders. These initiatives would coexist with traditional State regulation, to
ensure that local standards are respected and to provide additional means by
which local workers may exercise their collective rights.
However, the models are not merely overlapping mechanisms, nor are they
extensions of State control across transnational borders." The codes of
corporate conduct and their enforcement mechanisms signify a crucial
theoretical departure from traditional industrial relations principles. They are
essentially an extension of management power to self-regulate, 6 but in a
domain that would traditionally be addressed through one of two means:
protective legislation adopted by the State, or collective bargaining. In the
place of dispute resolution mechanisms, monitoring mechanisms extend

management power. The extension is often indirect, at least to the extent that
72. See HARVEY, supra note 13, at 190-92. See also Van Liemt, in Blapain. supranote 2, at 178
(describing just-in-time production practices as they apply to the relationship between local subcontractors
and multinational enterprises).
73. See James H. Mittelman, The Dynamic of Globalization, in GLOB UZAm"ION: CRITICAL
REFLECTIONS 1, 5 (James H. Mittelman ed., 1996); BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW
COMMON SENSE: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN THE PARADIGMATIC TRANSITION 270 (1995).
74. Max Rood predicts that labor law will respond to the pluralist and decentralizing tendencies in
society by eliciting different instruments to cope with a range of circumstances and needs of the different
social actors. See Max G. Rood, Internationalization:A New IncentiveforLabourLaw and SocialSecurity,
in LABOUR LAW AT THE CROSSROADS: CHANGING EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS 139, 144 (J.R. Bellace &
M.G. Rood eds., 1997).
75. An example of the extension of State control across transnational borders is the North American
Agreement on Labor (NAALC), which grants the regional framework of rights and recourse under the
regional framework of the North American Free Trade Agreement. For a description of the NAALC
mechanism, and others thatoverlap with the traditional forms of labor regulation, see Katherine Van Wezel
Stone, Laborand the GlobalEconomy: FourApproaches to TransnationalLabor Regulation, 16 MICH. J.
INT'L L 987, 1006-11 (Summer 1995).
76. See VERGE & VALuE, supra note 64, at 168-69 (arguing that management power represents a
unilateral form of rule-making in the workplace and stressing that this approach contrasts sharply with labor
regulation through collective bargaining and state regulation).
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the monitoring is considered "independent;" indeed, various steps are taken to
ensure that monitors are certified, and themselves audited. However, it is the
monitoring framework itself, structured along business accounting principles,
that more aptly captures the expansion of management power. Labor
standards are quantified, but labor relations are overlooked." In contrast to the
classic terrain of legal pluralist analysis, lex mercatoria"--or,law developed
by corporations to govern their own relationships-these corporate selfregulatory initiatives enable MNEs to extend their laws directly to workers
along the global production chain, disregarding, even undermining, local
enforcement efforts. Monitoring instead extends the ways that management
would approach the product, as in the SA8000 example, to the relationship of
subordination of its workers.
mH. ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION AND THE CHALLENGE OF CODES OF
CORPORATE CONDUCT

If corporate self-regulatory initiatives have gained some currency, it is in
no small measure because the workers' advocacy efforts surrounding them

simultaneously reflect an understanding of the asymmetries of economic
globalization"9 and problematize the dominant conception of globalization by
defying the perception that it is inevitable. However, in the process, the efforts
77. A recent critique by MIT professor Data O'Rourke of the monitoring methods of
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC) confirms this assessment. O'Rourke found that PwC's monitoring methods
were "significantly flawed," exhibiting a management bias in their standard auditing tools and approach.
O'Rourke found that many major labor violations were missed by auditors. The problems, O'Rourke
concluded, "go beyond the level of poorly trained auditors and flawed audit protocols. The significant and
seemingly systematic biases in PwC's methodologies call into question the company's very ability to
conduct monitoring that is truly independent." See Dam O'Rourke, Monitoring the Monitors: A Critique
of PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC)

Labor Monitoring, Sept.

28,

2000,

available at

http://www.cleanclothesorg/codestpwc-critique.htn. (last visited May 31, 2001).
78. See DE SousA SANTos, supra note 73, at 469 (discussing the various forms taken by the conflict
between the "transnational legal space" of lex mercatoriaand the "national state legal space:"
the contracts introduce vague clauses on applicable law such as the general principles
of law, the usages of commercial life, the only purpose being to eliminate or evade
the application of state law; the arbitration system is often resorted to with the same
purpose; commercial partners enter gentleman's agreements or protocols that often
violate national laws (particularly those on fair competition; the national legislation
enacted to police the contracts of transfer of technology has little efficacy; powerful
multinational corporations impose their laws on the states)).
79. For a discussion of the broad contours of the globalization nanative, see Adelle Blackett,
Globalizationand Its Ambiguities, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 57,60-66 (1998). On the broader question

of global governance, as opposed to government or formal interstate organization, see David Kennedy, New
Approaches to ComparativeLaw: Comparativismand InternationalGovernance, 2 UTAH L REv. 545, 548

(1997).
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risk reinforcing that dominant perception by obscuring the role of the State.
Given the limits that certain States face on their ability to act, however, the
transformative potential of the efforts may emerge if they can be harnessed to
shine a spotlight on structural problems and thereby compel deeper
transnational collaboration.
A. Asymmetry
Economic globalization is generally perceived as symmetrical or
uniform."0 This characterization obscures patterns of dependency and the
ways that specific places interact with and challenge the global.8" Whole
regions of the world, and various sectors of the economy, have either been left
out of the globalization phenomenon, or left behind in the literally "less than
global" analyses.8 2 Similarly, the perception of globalization as a linear
development across undifferentiated terrain overlooks the importance of place
in the globalization process.
In many developing countries, the asymmetry is reflected in material
constraints that lead to a mushrooming of the "informal sector" and that
prevent State labor inspection services and industrial relations dispute
resolution mechanisms from functioning fairly and efficiently in the
adversarial workplace context.8 3 Similarly, under the weight of structural
adjustment programs imposed by international financial institutions in the
80. See R.J.BARRYJONES,GLOBALISATIONANDINTERDEPENDENCEIN THE INTERNATIONALPOLITICAL
ECONOMY: RHETORIC AND REALITY 33 (1995). Jones challenges this view, by contending that "the
interconnectedness of the contemporary international political economy exhibits marked asymmetries and
imbalances, which underpin, and are reflected in, serious dependencies."
81. See generally Buchanan, supra note 9, at 371.
82. See Muchlinski, supra note 22, at 102 (asking the question "how far can the interests of MNEs
from developed home states create a legal order that refers to their culture and practices, rather than those
outside this cultural sphere?" and positing that "the capacity of local communities to destabilize" emerging
global business law is a necessary ingredient in any measure of the success of the global business law
project).
83.

See generally GwLOBALIZATION AND THIRD WORLD TRADE UNIONS: THE CHALLENGE OF RAPID

ECONOMIC CHANGE (Henk Thomas ed., 1995); Romero, supra note 3, at 408 (noting the shortcomings of
labor institutions that extend beyond EPZs and suggesting better coordination between labor and EPZ
authorities to streamline inspections and promote regulatory compliance). See also Arthurs, Private
Ordering, supra note 20, at 13-14 (suggesting that the differences between the ideal model of labor
regulation and the flawed reality render the appraisal of codes of corporate conduct more ambiguous). But
see Sabel et al., who, while acknowledging the need for "extensive inspectorates and other administrative
capacities to monitor firms, sanction violators, and counter their evasion efforts," suggest that a private
regulatory model should be favored instead of finding ways to reinforce the regulatory capacities of states.
A real strength of their work, however, is its attention to the informal sector, which often falls outside of
current regulatory regimes. See Sabel et al., supra note 39, at 14-15, 28-31, 33.
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wake of debt restructuring, many developing countries have been forced to reregulate their social sectors, sometimes to the detriment of labor relations
machinery. 8 Globalization has an asymmetrical impact on the scope and
effectiveness of labor laws in developing countries; these deficiencies leave
the terrain open for alternative non-State approaches.
Codes of corporate conduct have been somewhat effective at raising public
awareness primarily because they recognize and draw upon one of the
asymmetries of economic globalization: although goods may be produced in
many parts of the world, the overwhelming majority are imported by a few
rich, industrialized countries.s Purchasing power in this small number of
countries is drawn upon to influence the actions of MNEs. This consumerpower strategy is particularly effective in industries such as designer apparel
and footwear, where brand-name loyalty is crucial86 and by necessity renders
the products readily identifiable by the consumer as a product of the MNE
rather than of its many anonymous overseas sub-contractors."' These links
along the production chain offer a glimmer of regulatory possibilities that
transcend state frontiers."
84. See Seventh MNE Declaration Survey, supra note 8, at 112, 202. See also Vito Tanzi, The
Changing Role of the State in the Economy: A HistoricalPerspective, Working Paper of the International
Monetary Fund WP/97/114, at 7 (Sept. 1997), available at http://www.imf.org (last visited May 31, 2001)
(arguing that although it would appear that less developed countries would benefit from a larger government
role, supplementing market imperfections, they are the least likely to be able to deal with these deficiencies.
The author also maintains that "purely social" regulations, such as "controls on working hours, minimum
wages, and length of work week," are of debatable usefulness). A later version of this paper is published
in VITO TANzi, (POucIES,INSTITUTIONS AND THE DARK SIDE OF ECONOMICS 12-32 (2000). For an ILO
attempt to reach a consensus on the respective mandates of the World Bank and the IlO on labor law reform
in francophone Africa, see WORLD BANK & ILO, La riforne du Droit du Travail en Afriquefrancophone:
Actes du SMminaire par le Bureau Internationaldu Travail et la Banque mondiale (June 30-July 3, 1997).
The Governments, as well as workers and employers representatives at the seminar adopted Conclusions
that affirmed that labor law can provide workers with adequate protection while taking into consideration
economic efficiency and the productivity of enterprises. Id. at 26. The Conclusions cited the benefits of
establishing a balance between the interests of workers and employers through collective action, and the
ability to promote confidence between workers and employers through the establishment of transparent
workplace procedures. Id.
85. See HIRST & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 82-83.
86. The reputation value of the brand name is consequently crucial to self-regulatory initiatives. A
2000 accountant's survey of 1000 Canadian companies emphasized that the most influential reason to invest
resources in ethics initiatives was "protection or enhancement of reputation." See KPMG Canada, KPMG
Ethics Survey 2000-Managing for Ethical Practice, at http://www.kpmg.ca/english/services/fas/
publications/ethicssurvey2000.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2001).
87. It is perhaps not surprising that the OECD Inventory found that fair employment and labor rights
were mentioned 90% of the time in codes of corporate conduct in the light industry sector, which includes
apparel, textiles and footwear. See OECD Inventory, supra note 1,at 12-13.
88. See Arthurs, Private Ordering, supra note 20, at 11-12 (observing that "[elach stage in the
production process, each border crossed, each market served, each part of the larger corporate empire is
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Yet, by focusing on the places of production, the dichotomy becomes
clear: corporate self-regulatory initiatives leave unanswered a series of critical
coherence and feasibility questions in the labor regulatory environment. At a
mo~t basic level, the utility of holding corporations to "local standards" where
local markets have been "deregulated," regulated down, or where laws remain
unenforced must be questioned. The effective redefinition of "local standards"
is itself at stake. Turning attention away from the media-ready solutions
offered by codes of corporate conduct and toward the particulars of these

places may redirect attention onto the need to address these concrete questions.
A principled starting point from a labor regulation perspective would ensure
that spaces for democratic governance emerge in these re-regulated zones.
B. Inevitability
Economic globalization is also considered to be an inevitable, 9 inalterable
Human rights advocacy
process, beyond the control of public policy.'
challenges this unidirectional vision. Consumers, trade unions, and NGOs step
into the regulatory arena to problematize and possibly alter corporate actions
through the promotion of codes of corporate conduct. They do so while using
or subverting other developments that are frequently associated with
globalization "such as the increased ability to gather information and cooperate
across borders, often via rapidly developing communications technology."'
is in the interest of
potentially a site where employment practices can be called into question .... [I]t
transnational corporations to cosmeticise conflict, if they can... which can be facilitated by adopting
voluntary codes."). See also HARVEY, supra note 13, at 358 (noting that "when British Ford car workers
struck and stopped car production in Belgium and West Germany, they suddenly realized that spatial
dispersal in the division of labour is not entirely to the capitalists' advantage and international strategies are
feasible as well as desirable').

89. Robert W. Cox, A Perspectiveon Globalization, in

GLOBALIZATION: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS

21,

23 (James E. Mittelman ed., 1996) (refering to this phenomenon as the ideology of globalization, in which
"[g]lobalization began to be represented as a finality, as the logical and inevitable culmination of the
powerful tendencies of the market at work"). The argument is oddly deterministic-the difference from
economic determinism is that it is considered non-normative. See JONES, supra note 80, at 13-14 (arguing
that globalization need not necessarily be beneficial or detrimental to be inevitable).
90. See ROLAND ROBERTSON, GLOBALIZATION: SOCIAL THEORY AND GLOBAL CULTURE 61-62 (1992),
(rejecting this depiction). Drawing on Wallerstein's work, he contends that "conceptions of the worldsystem, including symbolic responses to and interpretations of globalization, are themselves important
factors in determining the trajectories of that very process." For Robertson, "its direction and outcome, and
hence the shape of the global field itself, are still very much 'up for grabs.'" Id.
91. According to O'Brien,
Accompanying the drive to lower labor costs has been the expansion of new
communications technology which has permitted the victims of such activity to
broadcast their plight Cheaper air travel, portable video recorders, lower telephone
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Their activities suggest that there is no one, linear course to globalization,92
and that civil society can play a role in contesting the dominant conception.
C. ObscuredRole of the State
The perceived inevitability of globalization tends also to obscure the role
of the state by rendering it the mere implementor of globalization's exigencies.
As attention is focused on the ways in which globalization challenges and
diminishes State action,93 the ways in which the State-and certain States in
particular-foster the global economy, and legitimize new forms of legality,
are overlooked.' The risk is thus that the role of the State-or certain States,
notably in the countries where the bulk of consumption takes place-becomes

further obscured.
NGOs that promote codes of corporate conduct might reinforce this
perception, possibly to the detriment of their traditional m6tier, lobbying
governments for regulatory action, be it at the local, national or transnational
level." NGOs have traditionally been seen as gadflies, bringing to a range of
costs, the Internet and e-mail have all been used to inform the public about labor
abuses in the manufacturing process. The distribution of stories about child workers
in the carpet industry, fires in toy factories, or the abuse of female factory workers
has led to a growing outcry amongst non-governmental organizations in numerous
countries.
O'Brien, Commentary, supranote 7, at 160. See also Krut, supra note 20, at 46-47 (providing examples
of several advocacy initiatives that have harnessed new technologies for their information sharing and
strategic work).
92. See Gunther Teubner, 'Global Bukowina ":Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW
WITHOUT A STATE, supra note 14 at 1,5 (arguing that "[tjhe modem experience... is of a fragmented rather
than a uniform globalization.... a highly contradictory and highly fragmented process in which politics has
lost its leading role.").
93. See SASSEN, DISCONTENTS, supra note 4, at 196 (arguing that the tendency to emphasize the
"hypermobility and liquidity of capital" remains only a "partial account" of the story of globalization).
94. Although Robd adopts a pluralist approach to notions of sovereignty, notably in relation to MNEs,
he nonetheless recognizes that "States have deliberately let these orders develop, albeit under pressure of
competition among themselves; indeed, they could hardly have done differently." See RobM, Multinational
Enterprises, supra note 14, at 68; see also SASSEN, DISCONTENTS supra note 4, at 200 (arguing that
"fd]eregulation and kindred policies constitute the elements of a new legal regime dependent on consensus
among states to further globalization").
95. There is a degree of irony, moreover, to the human rights advocacy by NGOs that emphasizes
voluntary, non-state-centered approaches. Recall that whenever the debate on whether to include social
clauses within trade agreements is raised, considerable attention tends to be placed on the perception that
linking labor standards to trade would be tantamount to a denial of sovereignty to individual states to
determine their own labor policy. Yet, with corporate consumer movements, individual states are effectively
being asked (or more often are not asked) to cede regulatory authority over labor matters through privatized,
self-regulatory initiatives. See Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(96)/DECW, (Dec. 13, 1996).
For a current discussion of the social clause issue, see Blackett, supra note 19, at 43-47.
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actors a plethora of key concerns, and galvanizing primarily States and
intergovernmental organizations into action. Indeed, it is not at all clear
whether the majority of NGOs are interested in displacing the States, by
themselves claiming the authority or assuming the responsibility associated
with making and enforcing key public policy decisions.' Yet, the more
privatized models of labor rights advocacy leads logically to this outcome.97
Trade policy is one element that obscures the role of the state. However,
it also illustrates the real limits that have been imposed on regulatory power
in some regions. Through their active participation in the world trading
regime, many states have adopted liberalization policies that have placed
certain matters beyond domestic control. For example, by turning its attention
to non-tariff barriers, notably government subsidies, the WTO has entered the
domain of governmental policy setting and regulation.9
Simply put,
governments cannot regulate as they might have before. The ability that
governments in industrialized countries had to step into the labor market (e.g.,
with a wide range of government subsidies to stimulate employment in
particular sectors and regions) is increasingly curtailed by trade agreements
that they have signed at regional and international levels. In developing
countries, this role was made possible by international financing, but the
predictable debt crisis that has ensued-and the austere structural adjustment
plans that have resulted-undermine States' abilities to promote employment
and fund labor relations machinery. Viewed in this light, a certain regulatory
deficit in the labor domain already exists.
Conditions of regulatory competition also affect the role of the state, by
leading individual States to regulate-down or under-enforce labor standards,
particularly in certain sectors of their economies.99 The need to attract foreign
96. See Krut, supra note 20, at 49 (concluding that the role of civil society in global governance is "to
influence agents and act as moral compasses, not to replace states or an intergovernmental process").
97. Indeed, Sabel et al. explicitly endorse this outcome, and recommend that international
organizations like the ILO and the World Bank "coax national governments to adopt [ratcheting labor
standards]-compatible labor law by developing model legislation and international covenants." See Sabel
et al., supra note 39, at 33. They candidly assert that, "convictions aside, these institutions might be drawn
to support this regulatory alternative because it frees them from adjudicatory responsibilities they are ill
equipped to handle, while allowing them to participate in the articulation of feasible standards according
to principles they know from the arenas of economic development and trade: transparency and competition."
Id.
98. See Frieder Roessler, Diverging Domestic Policies and Multilateral Trade Integration, in FAIR
TRADE AND HARMONIZATION, supra note 54. at 41.
99. One example, highly centered on brand name loyalty, is the footwear and clothing industry. See
ILO, REPORT FOR DISCUSSION AT THE TRIPARTITE MEETING ON THE GLOBALIZATION OF THE FOoTwEAR.
AND CLOTHrG INDUSTRmES: EFFECTS ON EMPLOYMENT AND WORKING CONDITIONS (1996),

TEXTL

available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/sectorsectors/textile.htm (last visited May 31,
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direct investment is often at odds with government labor regulatory
responsibilities. The simple threat of exit by MNEs can be sufficient to induce
many nation states to loosen regulatory apparatuses.'" Collective action
problems exist; the extent to which they may encourage a "race to the bottom"
remains open to empirical inquiry.'"' In this case as well, State action in one
area leaves the State with a limited range of policy options in other areas.
In the face of these limits on State action, corporate self-regulatory
02
initiatives draw on a degree of flexibility that States cannot as easily attain.
Rather, they creatively overcome some of the immediate realities of select
groups of people living in different parts of distinct developing countries. The
initiatives may shed light on the fact that many developing States are simply
unable to legislate away major social and redistributional problems that are
103
linked to labor standards violations.
It is conceivable that the beginnings of a new, decentered regulatory
2001).
100. See Gerald Epstein, International Capital Mobility and the Scope for National Economic
Management, in STATES AGAINST MARKETS: THE LIMITs OF GLoBALIZATION (1996) 211, 212, 220 (Robert
Boyer & Daniel Drache eds., 1996).
101. See Langille, GeneralReflections, supra note 54, at 254-55 (quoting MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK &
ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 7 (1995)). See also Mark Barenberg,
Federalismand American LaborLaw: Toward A CriticalMapping of the "Social Dumping" Question, in
HARMONIZATION OF LEGISLATION INFEDERAL SYSTEMS 93 (IngolfPemice ed., 1996). One important recent
example is in the Caribbean region. The region comprises micro States with open, yet not very diversified
economies. They are characterized by small GDPs, yet reasonably high per capita incomes and generally
well-educated English speaking populations. Most are member States of the CARICOM regional trade
arrangement. When one MNE based in Barbados "hinted" that it might be more economical to transfer its
operations to a neighbouring island because of its disagreement with the local voluntarist approach to the
recognition of trade unions, ministers of labor in the CARICOM, trade unions and employers' organizations
met. The member States decided that the company would not be welcomed in another CARICOM member
State were it to seek to transfer its operations. Ultimately, the company decided to stay. See ILO Governing
Body, Subcommittee on Multinational Enterprises, GB.280/MNE/I/2, 280th Session, Geneva, Mar. 2001
(Part II) at 301, available at http://www.ilo.org/publie/english/standards/relm/gb /docs/gb280/pdf/men-l2.pdf (last visited June 14, 2001).
102. This flexibility differs from the euphemistic form of flexibility that has become synonymous with
the economic liberalization, facilitated by the removal of workplace regulations such as protection against
dismissals.
103. A particularly poignant example is found in attempts to eradicate child labor. Consider that after
the advocacy and media attention surrounding the "foul ball" campaign in Bangladesh, soccer ball
manufacturers initially threatened simply to fire the children whom they employed to sew their product.
Instead, the U.S. government and two international organizations, UNICEF and the ILO, intervened, and
a deal was brokered between the local association of manufacturers, UNICEF, and the ILO. Under the terms
ofthat agreement, the children who had been working would be paid to attend school until the age of fifteen,
and older family members would be hired to replace them. Ultimately, the spotlight effect forced a
response, but to avoid a thoroughly unsatisfactory outcome, inter-state agencies became central to the
resolution. See Steven Greenhouse, Sporting Goods ConcernsAgree to Combat Sale of Soccer Balls Made
by Children,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1997, at Al, A17.
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infrastructure might be rooted in this flurry of individual, often mediatized,
solutions. It is even plausible that consumer-based movements to monitor

codes of corporate conduct could reinforce transnational solidarity, allowing
NGOs in the West to convert workers' concerns into viable regulatory
schemes. However, the more publicized examples (and, consequently, the
ones that are most effective at spotlighting labor rights violations) tend to be
highly selective, focusing on issues that are at the forefront of Western
consumers' concern." Some NGOs have contributed to this selectivity by
facilitating media sensationalization of the "plight" of workers in developing
countries without promoting a deeper understanding of the material conditions
in those particular places.0 5
Barriers to sustained, standardized

communication of information are prevalent.
Moreover, as currently crafted, corporate self-regulatory initiatives rarely
permit the direct engagement of local trade unions and human rights
organizations in product-exporting countries. "s Similarly, they fail to
challenge the power of MNEs to determine working conditions without the
participation of the workers concerned. The protective value of the codes is
therefore questionable, and the democratic participation of local workers is
overlooked.
It is important to add that capital flight has in some cases been the
response to labor advocacy applying codes of conduct to particular places."°7
It is therefore crucial to avoid the tendency to romanticize the disruptive power
of civil society"°s by failing to grapple with the power of MNEs.' 9 The ability
104. The predominant attention given to child labor is one example of this phenomenon. The attention
given to different labor rights tends also to vary depending on the particular country in which the products
are marketed and sold. For example, freedom of association issues are reported to be more commonly
addressed in European codes than in U.S. codes. See Janelle M. Diller, Social Conduct in transnational
enterprise operations: the role of the International Labour Organization, in Blanpain, supra note 2, at 17.
105. See Krut, supra note 20, at 13.
106. Although some NGOs based in MNE home countries appear to have developed close ties to local
workers' representatives, others seem to act on the premise that the protective potential of the labor rights
initiatives justifies the lack of local involvement in their establishment.
107. Indeed, the mere ability to threaten flight significantly affects both privatized human rights
initiatives and state regulation. See Langille, GeneralReflections. supra note 54, at 237.
108. See Held, who remarks that "[a]n appeal to the nature or inherent goodness of grass-roots
associations and movements bypasses the necessary work of theoretical analysis." DAVID HELD,
DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER

286 (1995).

109. According to Krut, "[t]hese groups technically are NGOs and are increasingly visible at
international political events, but their credibility as representatives of civil society is frequently challenged.
...Their disproportionate financial power gives their legitimate lobbying activity far more efficacy than
that of other NGO groups." See Krut, supra note 20, at 20. But see SAsKiA SAssEN, LosING CONTROL:
SOVEREIGNTY INAN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 27 (1996) ("both the global capital market and human rights
codes can extract accountability from the state.... Both have gained a kind of legitimacy.") [hereinafter
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of MNEs to consolidate their control over the means of production, to
transform that control into power, and to exercise that power transnationally" °
underscores the existence of a global context in which various legal orders
with distinct and conflicting interests coexist and challenge each other. In the
labor context, attention must be given to the ways that State action-nationally
and internationally, by some States differently than by others-can be
reconstituted to counterbalance the power that MNEs exercise over workers.
In sum, corporate self-regulatory initiatives have been better at
spotlighting selected, often poignant examples of certain kinds of labor rights
abuses than at exposing the layers of complexity surrounding compliance with
labor standards while crafting broadly satisfying solutions. The challenge is
to prevent that attention to individual situations from eclipsing the harder,
more systematic, but indispensable work of addressing broader structural
problems in a sustainable, consistent, and equitable fashion. In other words,
by explicitly considering the importance of place, corporate codes can broaden
the discussion"' of labor rights to address the frequent inability of developing
countries and transition economies to provide functional labor inspection and
dispute resolution services, not to mention suitable schools. Solving these
problems will necessitate concerted, complex transnational interactions. In
this sense, despite the elements of globalizing discourse that question the
relationship between the state and the private sector, the more pertinent inquiry
in the already pluralistic labor law context should focus on the redefinition of
the rights of workers and the power of employers."' To do so, it would be

SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL).

110. See Rob6, Multinational Enterprises, supra note 14, at 69-71. Rob6 observes that
The liberal system of the exercise of power is based on the presupposition which is
invalidated by the development of the corporate economy- in the liberal state of law,
the control of means of production is not treated as a power, which rejects its
manifestations out of the sphere of public law's concern. In the spirit of the liberal
constitution, as it was conceived in the late eighteenth century, and in the reality of
the facts of the time, the control of the means of production is diffused within the
whole of society. The political ideal glimpsed at that time was one of a republic of
small owners, unable to transform means of production into power by concentrating
them. But the Industrial Revolution and the concentration of property rights-and
thus of the basic, original, fundamental power to make decisions- in enterprises
have changed the whole picture.
Id at 71 (internal citations omitted).
I 1t. See Kolk, supra note 34, at 171 (contending that "[c]odes-now more than ever before -- have the
function of deciphering the limits of regulation and the roles of governments, firms and representatives of
civil society. Codes are an 'entry to talk.' The agenda-setting potential of codes, therefore, should not be
underestimated.")
112. See Supiot, supra note 56, at 205.
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important to raise the hard questions that are linked to the decentering of the
State by focusing on the significance of particular places of production, and by
probing representation and democratic governance. To accept that MNEs are
indeed acting as regulators over particular places puts the normative
question-who should regulate- in stark relief.
IV. DECENTERING THE STATE: REPRESENTATION THROUGH COSMOPOLITAN
DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION

The patchwork of analysis on globalization and global governance that is
found in the notion of the decentered State"1 3 might provide a helpful starting
point for shaping emerging forms of pluralist labor regulation. That literature
complements the two analytical frameworks used in this Article to examine
codes of corporate conduct-legal pluralism and economic globalization. By
focusing on the complexity and composition of "the State," it seeks to dislodge
the grip of narrow notions of sovereignty, pointing instead to the potential of
overlapping, fragmented, layered sovereignties." 4 That literature has
developed a notion of cosmopolitan democratic governance," 5 attentive to
individuals and groups as rights holders"' and actors in transnational spaces,
that can usefully be imported into the discussion of labor rights.
To the extent that independent, representative NGOs and trade unions play
a central role in the movement to establish corporate codes of conduct, by
insisting that corporations assume some direct responsibility for the human
rights consequences of their transnational exploits, they contribute to a more
layered notion of sovereignty. However, in labor relations law, where
overlapping sovereignty in the creation of workplace law already exists
through state frameworks, the contribution is less than clear.
Instead, a decentering that acknowledges the already pluralistic
foundations and aims of labor law, but seeks to broaden both its representative
113. See, e.g., SASsEN, LOSING CONTROL, supra note 109. See also Karen Knop, Re/Statements:
Feminism and State Sovereignty in InternationalLaw, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 293 (1993);
Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., InternationalLaw and InternationalRelations Theory: A New Generationof
InterdisciplinaryScholarship,92 AM. J. INT'L L. 367, 378, 390 (1998).
114. See Rob, MultinationalEnterprises,supranote 14, at 55-56.
115. 1borrow the term "cosmopolitan democracy" from David Held, who rethinks democracy in light
of "overlapping local, regional and global processes." He draws on a notion of democracy that engages the
accountability of a range of related and interconnected power systems. HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE
GLOBAL ORDER, supra note 108, at 267.
116. See, e.g., Andrea Bianchi, Globalization of Human Rights: The Role of Non-state Actors, in
GLOBAL LAw WITHOUT A STATE, supra note 14, at 179, 180.
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scope (to the new workers who are the subject of its regulations) and its
geographic scope (to the particular places where MNEs locate their production
overseas), is more likely to promote the protective and participatory principles
that labor law espouses. This is the terrain of "cosmopolitan democracy."
A. 'Cosmopolitan Democracy' and the TransnationalWorkplace
By invoking "cosmopolitan democracy," I start from the premise that
democracy entails more than simple majority voting rights. I also link
democracy to the ability of stakeholders to have a say in decisions that affect
them." 7 Further, I assert that the workplace is a key locus for a more
participatory form of democracy to emerge.'
As the workplace becomes
increasingly transnational, so too must the rights of democratic participation
stretch across and beyond national borders." 9
This process of "deepening and extending democracy across nations,
regions and global network[s]"' 2 ° is what Held refers to as "the entrenchment
of democratic autonomy on a cosmopolitan basis,"'' hence "cosmopolitan
democracy." For Held, cosmopolitan democracy draws attention to the
"system of governance which arises from and is adapted to the diverse
conditions and interconnections of different peoples and nations."' " Held
considers the notion to encompass the development of a transnational
117. There is of course a voluminous literature on participatory democracy. For an articulation that
comes closest to the underlying considerations of this piece, see generally IRis MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE
AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1995). See also Colleen Sheppard, "Equality Rights and Democratic
Theory," May 16, 2000 (paper presented to the McGill Centre for Research and Teaching on Women)
(exploring connections between evolving conceptions of equality rights and participatory democracy)
(unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
I18. This view is shared by the former chief economist of the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz. Joseph
Stiglitz, DemocraticDevelopment as the Fruits of Labor: Keynote Address to the InternationalRelations
Research Association, Boston, Jan. 2000, available at http://www.worldbank.orglkmowledge/chiefecon
/articleslboston.htm. (last visited May 31, 2001) (articulating the economic benefits of workplace
democracy). See also Iris Marion Young, Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy,
in IRIS MARION YOUNG, INTERSECTING VOICES: DILEMMAS OF GENDER, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND
POLICY 60 (1997) (stressing the need to emphasize democratic communication across differences of culture,
social standing and need to arrive at an "understanding," broadly defined).
119. Implicit is the claim that the exercise of political and economic power will continue to elude
effective democratic control "while democracy remains rooted in a fixed and bounded territorial
conception." Rather, "[g]lobalization demands that we re-form our existing territorially defined democratic
institutions and practices so that politics can continue to address human aspirations and needs." See David
Held & Anthony McGrew, Globalization, 5 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 483, 495 (1999).
120. See DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 353 (2d ed, 1996).
121. Id.
122. See David Held, Democracy and the New InternationalOrder, in COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY
96, 106 (Daniel Archibugi & David Held eds., 1995) [hereinafter Held, New InternationalOrder].
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infrastructure," 2 not as a replacement for but "as a necessary complement"' 24
to local and national governance structures. Also critical to the development
of international institutions is the construction of "broad avenues of civic
participation in decision-making at regional and global levels.' 25
Although Held's insights are informative, this Article's use of the notion
of cosmopolitan democracy also reflects David Harvey's intuition that "the
turn to more flexible labor processes could be seen as an opening to a new era
of democratic and highly decentralized labor relations and co-operative
endeavours."'' 6 This Article therefore deviates from Held's proposal, which
focuses on a rather different representational project, the creation of regional
parliaments, 27 and instead concentrates exclusively on the creation of
participatory possibilities for those most concerned with the changing
workplace."
This Article proposes that cosmopolitan participatory democracy, as it
relates to labor regulation, might be implemented at several levels: the local
(that is, within specific workplaces); the national (through specific forms of
regulation); and the international (through the creation of participatory spaces
for democratic dialogue). Transnational initiatives will likely have an effect
across and between the spaces that weave these levels together.
In the labor context, an organizing framework for this kind of participation
already exists; it is captured in the notion of "tripartism," which is the
industrial relations model that exists to varying degrees in most States around
the world. At its most basic level, tripartism means three-way interaction,
advisory, or more, between governments, workers, and employers.' 2
Tripartism is also reflected at the international level in the structure of the ILO.
123. Held focuses on the regional and international levels, paying particular attention to the United
Nations. See HELD,MODELS OF DEMOCRAcY, supra note 120, at 353-60; see also Held, New International
Order, supra note 122, at 106-14.
124. HELD, MODELS OF DEmoCRAcy, supra note 120, at353.
125. Id. at 354.
126. See HARVEY, supra note 13, at 353.
127. See HELD,MODELS OF DEMocRACY, supra note 120, at 354.
128. 1 acknowledge, however, that Held's suggestion of "general referenda" that would cut across
nations to comprise constituencies defined according to the nature and scope of controversial transnational
issues aims at grassroots participation, albeit through a vehicle that may yield outcomes reflective of the
status quo. See id.
at 355.
129. See Anne Trebilcock, Tripartite Consultation and Cooperation in National-Level Economic and
Social Policy-Making: An Overview, in ANNETREBILCOCKET AL, TOWARDS SOCIAL DIALOGUE: TRIPARTITE
COOPERATION IN NATIONAL ECONoMIC AND SOCIAL POUCY-MAKING 1, 3 (1994) (clarifying that tripartite

cooperation can encompass bipartite activities between employers and workers' representatives, where the
government is the silent partner that establishes parameters, as well as broad participation by those actors
in the administration of state institutions, notably in the field of occupational health and safety.)
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In the annex to the ILO's constitution, the Declaration of Philadelphia states
that the ILO considers "the representatives of workers and employers [to
enjoy] equal status with those of governments."'-'
The Declaration of
Philadelphia crafts a role by which they "join... in free discussion and
democraticdecision with a view to the promotion of the common welfare."''
Accordingly, within all structures of the organization, "social partners" have
direct rights of participation. Tripartism embodies the traditional labor law
paradigm through which the objectives of worker protection and democratic
participation were to be realized. The ILO is seen historically as a broadly
representative forum, an early and still relevant example of how the State
might be decentered in international fora while retaining a pivotal role in
determining policy.
This rather unique international organizational model has recently gained
renewed attention. For some, it evokes the possibilities for a participatory
approach to other international policy matters, like environmental concerns." 2
For others, it represents an outdated, ossified entrenchment of certain

corporatist' 33 monopoly interests, which fail to reflect the extent to which the
working world has changed.'
130. ILOCONST. annex, Article 1,available athttp://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/iloconst.htm.
131. Id. (emphasis added).
132. See DANmiL EsTY, GREENING THE GAT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND THE FuTURE 73-98
(1994Xarguing for a Global Environmental Organization). See also Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Resolving TradeEnvironment Conflicts: The Case for Trading Institutions, 27 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 607, 622-24 (1994);
Jeffrey L Dunoff, From Green to Global: Towardthe TransformationoflnternationalEnvironmentalLaw,
19 HARV. ENVTL. L REV. 241,260 (1995).
133. For a discussion of corporatism as it relates to democratic theory, see HELD, MODELS OF
DEMOCRACY, supra note 120, at 226-31. Held argues that:
In the corporatist account, the directive capacities of the state have increased,
allowing it to construct a framework for economic and political affairs. In return for
direct channels of bargaining with state officials-a 'representational
monopoly'-leaders of key organized interests... were expected to deliver support
for agreed policies and, if necessary, keep their own members firmly in line. The
politics of negotiation became systematized along stricter, more formal lines,
although most of the discussion between parties took place informally, behind closed
doors and out of public view. A few key organizations participated in the resolution
of pressing questions in exchange for relatively advantageous settlements for their
members. Corporatist arrangements were, then, political strategies for securing the
support of dominant trade unions, business associations and their respective
constituencies.
Id. at 227-28.
134. Held discusses the critique that the special rights given to dominant, powerful groups at the
national level erodes the broader electoral support of more vulnerable groups, as well as respect for
traditional institutions for conflict to be channeled, such as collective bargaining. See id. at 231.
Internationally, serious concerns are raised about the representativeness of mainstream trade unions and
employers' organizations, and the relative lack of representation of other members of civil society.
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It is true that one strand of criticism considers the corporatist State to be
fundamentally anti-democratic, as it tends to bypass parliamentary process in
favor of exclusionary, opaque, tripartite decision-making. However, that
critique is not only tempered by the limited scope of such decision-making; 13'
it also seems somewhat beside the point, as economic policy is increasingly
formulated beyond the reaches of national actors. The importance of input by
civil society members across local, national, and transnational borders is
increasingly recognized. To the extent that tripartism understands the State in
its relation to labor relations as being a composite of civil society and key
economic actors, the notion may provide a way to reintroduce the State-in its
decentered form-and reintroduce worker agency into transnational attempts
to achieve more equitable workplace relations. Indeed, the more relevant
critique of corporatism focuses on the current representative nature of the
traditional representatives of labor and employers. It is by rethinking notions
of representation that a more cosmopolitan democratic model, anchored in the
broad principle of tripartism, has the most potential in the transnational
economic context.
B. Tripartite-PlusRepresentation

Representation is at the heart of the sometimes strained relationship
between NGOs and trade unions with respect to self-regulatory initiatives. It
reflects some of the cultural and historical differences that affect the
worldview of these quite different organizations. For example, political
scientist Robert O'Brien asserts that trade unions tend to have more faith in
relying on the State for adequate regulation than do NGOs 36 However,
O'Brien's assertion overlooks the fact that while independent NGOs may
maintain a greater critical distance from the State than those trade unions that
come from a more corporatist tradition, trade unions have also developed a
mode of representation through which they cooperate with management to

Consider, for example, that until most recently, the only NGO regularly to attend the ILO conference and
that has developed a working strategy vis-A-vis the ILO was Amnesty International. See Leary, supra note
62, at 24. By contrast, the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which has a more
traditional organizational structure, has incorporated a broad range of NGOs into its advisory and
consultative bodies. See LUCIE LAMARCHE, PERSPECrES OCCIDENTALES DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL DES
DRLOITS -CONOMIQUES DE LA PERSONNE 17-18, 222 (1995).
135. See Trebilcock, supra note 129, at 11-12 (discussing the impact of economic dislocation after the
1973 "oil shock" on tripartite labor relations institutions).
136. See O'Brien, Commentary, supra note 7, at 162.
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regulate themselves.' 37 They have structures that enable them to seek conflict
resolution without direct recourse to the State.
There is also a commonly-held perception that NGOs are less selfinterested than trade unions, which are primarily concerned with extracting
benefits for their limited range of members, to the detriment of the broader
work force.'38 This perception is nurtured by the fact that many NGOs can at
least make the claim that they represent those who suffer violations of certain
fundamental human rights. Indeed, because of legislative prohibitions, the
individuals they represent are not likely to be considered "workers" eligible to
join a union. Child laborers and forced laborers most obviously fall within this
category, but other workers, such as domestic workers and home workers (who
tend to be women from economically underprivileged backgrounds) regularly
face the same dilemma.' 39 Others may tend to be traditionally marginalized
workers (notably certain minorities), those who have experienced the greatest
difficulty obtaining unionization (notably migrants), or those whose interests
have not historically been effectively represented within traditional union
structures (notably women workers)." 4° In many of these cases, the workers
may be represented more effectively by organizing through NGOs around
identities other than "worker." By focusing on how globalization affects these
most marginalized workers, the representative deficit of mainstream trade
unions is brought to the fore.
However, as NGOs proliferate, the differences among them may become
greater than their similarities. Consider that in 1997, eight large NGOs
controlled nearly half of the U.S. $8 billion resources represented by the entire
137. According to the World Bank,
[n]ations that, usually for political reasons, limit the freedom of unions to organize
and operate are left without a mechanism that allows workers and firms to negotiate
wages and working conditions equitably. The result has tended to be excessive
intervention and regulation as governments try to pacify workers and gain support
for state-controlled unions.
THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1995: WORKERS IN AN INTEGRATING WORLD 79-80
(1995).
138. See. e.g., id at 80 (arguing that "unions can also have a negative economic effect. In some
countries they behave as monopolists, protecting a minority group of relatively well-off unionized workers
at the expense of the unemployed and those in rural and informal markets, whose formal sector employment
opportunities are correspondingly reduced").
139. See generally WOMEN IN TRADE UNIONS: ORGANIZING THE UNORGANIZED (Margaret Hosmer
Martens & Swasti Mitter eds., 1994); see also Adelle Blackett, Making domestic work visible: the case for
specfic regulation (ILO Working Paper, 1998), available at httpJ/www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/
govlab/papers/1 998/domestic/index.htm.
140. See Marion Crain, Between Feminism and Unionism: Working Class Women, Sex Equality, and
Labor Speech, 82 GEo. L.J. 1903 (1994).
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NGO market.141 Yet little distinction is made between the widely differing
types of associations. Moreover, the term "non-governmental organization"
fails to capture the distinction between broad-based membership organizations
and those representing only a few persons. "2 The channels of accountability
for NGOs are sometimes non-existent. As I suggest in this Article, relations
between local civil society groups and transnational NGOs may themselves be
problematic. Indeed, some NGOs need to safeguard close relationships with
international donor agencies; this concern might affect their local delivery.' 43
The gulf between NGOs in the North and those in the South is further widened
by inequities of power, limited access to technology and resources, the
prevalence of the English language, and divergent interests.'" Some attention
to the implications of these disparities is therefore warranted. Yet, the labor
rights advocacy surrounding codes of corporate conduct emphasizes NGO
representation without focusing on the representative character of the groups
that are engaged in advocacy.
Despite this important oversight, the claims of representative character still
rest quite firmly on the broadly-defined distribution of interests represented by
the categories of workers, employers, and governments. Arguably, corporate
self-regulatory initiatives highlight the extent to which other concerned
groups, such as human rights advocates and consumer lobbies, have a stake in
the globalization of labor relations. Tripartism broadly understood,'45 which
might also be referred to as "tripartism plus," would enable representation to
shift and broaden according to the issues and interests concerned; it might
therefore be more responsive to the new international division of labor and to
changing regulatory needs. Tripartism plus would be based on a fluid notion
of identity,"4 recognizing that the term "worker" is at once a partial
representation and a composite of different actors. It would provide a way for
participatory rights to be claimed for a broader spectrum of affected actors,
locally, nationally, transnationally and internationally.
141. See Krut, supra note 20, at 8.
142. See id
143. See DE SousA SANTOS, supranote 73, at 268.
144. See Knit, supra note 20, at 14,50.

145. For an early discussion of this broadened notion, see Trebilcock, supra note 129, at 9, 29, 35, and
44.
146. See generally Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Labor'sDivided Ranks: Privilege and the United
Front Ideology, 84 CORNELL L REv. 1542 (1999) (underscoring the challenges to the notion of labor
solidarity presented by gender and race diverse workforces); Molly S. McUsic & Michael Selmi,

Postmodern Unions: IdentityPolitics in the Workplace, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1339 (1997) (thinking through the
ways that attention to identity may complement the status of worker).
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Tripartism plus would rest on a deep understanding of notions of identity
and difference, recognizing as crucial to any participatory initiatives actors
beyond the traditional tripartite actors. In this regard, I agree with Harvey,
who asserts that a dynamic approach to dealing with the new paradigm in labor
regulation 4 7 would demand theorization of omnipresent yet historically and
geographically contingent aspects of social organization, such as race and
gender.'" The organizing notion of "citizenship" in its varied manifestations,
for persons and for corporations," 9 and across levels of governance, also needs
to be fundamentally rethought. ,5o
While there is a tendency to focus on the breadth of the term "worker,"
there is also room to broaden the understanding of the other two tripartite
actors-governments and employers. Indeed, national governments, as
representatives of "the State," invariably fail to reflect the full social diversity
of their citizens; in some cases, their broader legitimacy, hence their ability to
govern as the sovereign in international law, is itself in question. "' Tripartism
plus provides a way to grapple with the MNEs and other economic
organizations, such as the international chambers of commerce, and include
them in debates that concern them, without lumping them into the same
representational pool as NGOs that advocate on behalf of workers.'52 The
notion can provide room to distinguish between small, local subcontractors
and MNEs, between powerful foreign affairs and trade ministries and
147. See Arthurs, supra note 69, at 3 and accompanying text.
148. See HARVEY, supra note 13, at 355. See also HELD,MODELS OF DEmOCRACY, supranote 159, at
264-65, 273. Held recognizes that
distinctive national, ethnic, cultural and social identities are part of the very basis of
people's sense of being-in-the-world; they provide deeply rooted comfort and
distinctive social locations for communities seeking a place 'at home' on this earth.
But these identities are always only one possible identity, among others. They are
historically and geographically contingent
Held, New International Order, supra note 122, at 116. Attention to diversity would also entail paying
attention to the cultural specificity of communication, that is "to the way that power sometimes enters
speech itself' and the need to "[propose] a more inclusive model of communication." See Young,
Communication and the Other, supra note 118, at 63.
149. See SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL, supra note 109; see also Daniel M. Downes & Richard Janda,
Virtual Citizenship, 13 CAN. J. L & SOc. 27 (1998).
150. See Kim Rubenstein & Daniel Adler, International Citizenship: The Future of Nationality in a
Globalized World, 7 IND. 1. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 519 (2000) (identifying the consequences for
"nationality" in a world where sovereignty is challenged by the process of globalization).
151. See Thomas M. Franck, Fairnessto Persons: The Democratic Entitlement inFairness,in FAIRNESS
ININTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTItUONS 83 (1995) (tracing the foundations and scope of this democratic
right in international law).
152. See Krut, supranote 20, at 20 (exploring some of the difficulties caused by the fact that under UN
NGO recognition criteria, the distinction between MNEs and public interest NGOs is not clearly
established).
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relatively under-resourced labor ministries.
Despite this flexibility, participatory democracy invariably will imply that
some concerned groups will not have access to transnational decision-making
all the time.'5 3 However, adopting a more fluid notion of which groups should
have access to dialogue on which issues at which times would seem to meet
this concern. In other words, rather than entrenching rights of access to a
broader range of groups, tripartism plus would instead seek to ensure that
participation varies and is regularly re-thought. Once a principled starting
point for participation has been established, attention can be turned to
developing mechanisms to ensure that participatory access is also funded."5
C. A ConcreteApplication: Thoughtsfor the Developing Framework of
the United Nations Global Compact
Rethinking codes of corporate conduct in the light of the notion of
tripartism plus can have immediate applications. In this section, I examine one
recent initiative at the international level, the UN's Global Compact,
discussing how its attention to labor rights might be reconceived to reflect the
specificity of labor regulation and to promote more cosmopolitan democratic
governance. By turning to the international, I do not wish to convey that the
international should necessarily be the locus of all solutions designed to
escape, or extend beyond, the national. Nor do I mean to obscure the
importance of place to labor regulation, or the role of individual state and other
actors in creating particular places. Rather, I turn to the international to
consider a framework that crafts a complementary role for the participation of
multiple actors, while retaining its effectiveness across governance levels. 55
153. See id.
at 16 (noting that while certain models of participatory democracy might in theory allow
more people to "fill up the 'back of the room' in international decision-making, it may not allow new and
weaker NGOs entry at all. Nevertheless, direct and participatory democracy remains a strong model for
smaller, developing country NGOs").
154. Mechanisms for funding participation are also worked into the ILO's notion of tripartism.
Government delegations that fund their own participation are also required to ensure that there are tripartite
delegations; this can entail paying for them to participate. Depending on the activity, the Organization itself
contributes toward the travel expenses of delegates. This overcomes the assumption in some other for a that
civil society representatives should pay their own way, or not attend. Although these features have not
erased inequities in the relative size of delegations that arrive individual member States, they nonetheless
enable participatory rights to have some meaning.
155. This analysis is meant to affirm Iris Marion Young's assertion in the context of democratic theory
and international justice that "[w]orking through social and political relations that affirm a positive sense
of group difference and give specific representation to oppressed groups may be the most important political
agendum in the world today." See Iris Marion Young, InternationalJustice, in JuSTICE AND THE POLITICS
OF DIFFERENCE, supra note 117, at 257, 259.
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At the rather exclusive World Economic Forum in Davos, held on January
31, 1999, world economic and political elites, momentarily humbled by the
scathing critiques of the management of the Asian financial crisis,
acknowledged the importance of stable institutions to accompany economic
growth. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan challenged these participants to
embrace a new Global Compact, calling upon businesses to support and
respect nine principles covering a range of human rights, labor standards, and
environmental principles."5 At a "high level" meeting in July 2000, the
Secretary General convened a number of large corporations, business
associations, major representatives of labor, and several major civil society
organizations.'
At that meeting, approximately fifty MNEs took a public
stand on the Global Compact and its principles, pledging to translate the
principles into corporate practice.'
The labor standards articulate the
fundamental principles and rights at work contained in the ILO's 1998
Declaration. 59 Explanatory documents list ILO core labor standards and other
UN instruments as reference sources, and set out reasons why adhering to
labor standards is in the corporations' best interests."'°
Despite the Global Compact's resemblance to many coordinated initiatives
surrounding codes of corporate conduct, its organizers resist characterizing it
in this manner.'" Instead, the Global Compact is meant to "[highlight] the
156. See United Nations Global Compact Network, The Nine Principles: A Compact for the New
Century (Jan. 31, 1999), available at http.lwww.unglobalcompact.org/gcIUNWeb.nsf/contentlthenine.htm
(last visited June 16, 2001) [hereinafter The Global Compact].
157. See United Nations Global Compact Network, Executive Summary and Conclusion - High-Level
Meeting on the Global Compact, July 26, 2000, at http://www.un.org/partners/ business/ gcevent/ press/
summary.htm (last visited June 16, 2001) [hereinafter Global Compact Meeting].
158. Id. The specific requirements of the pledge are as follows:
1. Advocating the Compact in their mission statements, annual reports and similar
venues;
2.
At least once a year, posting on the Global Compact website specific examples
of progress they have made, or lessons they have learned, in putting the
principles into practice;
3.
Joining with the United Nations in partnership projects, either at the policy
level-for instance, a dialogue on the role of corporations in zones of
conflict-or at the operational level in developing countries, such as helping
villagers link up to the Internet, or strengthening small and medium-sized
firms.
Id.
159. See discussion at supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
160. See The Global Compact, supra note 156 (Principles 3. 4. 5. 6) at http://www.unglobal compact.
org/gc/UNWeb.nsf/content/prin3456.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2001).
161. See Global Compact Meeting, (Issues relating to the Global Compact), at http://www.un.org/
partnerslbusiness/gcevent/presslwhatis.htm ("'The Global Compact is not a code of conduct; monitoring and
verification of corporate practices do not fall within the mandate or the institutional capability of the United

442

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES

[Vol. 8:401

global citizenship qualities of corporations and [open] up opportunities for
focused, mediated, directed and constructive dialogue."' 6 2 And although the
expression "global citizenship qualities of corporations" is laden with
presumably unintended implications, '63its use in this context appears primarily
propagandistic. The more interesting dimension of the initiative, for the
discussion of cosmopolitan democracy, remains its recognition that corporate
self-regulatory initiatives open up opportunities for discussion.
Bringing the business community into UN sponsored dialogue has
significant implications and invariably weighty consequences. From the start,
the Global Compact has been met with biting criticism, and with the call for
the United Nations to rethink the entire strategy in order to avoid "participating
in a 'bluewash' [by] allowing some of the largest and richest corporations to
wrap themselves in the United Nations' blue flag without requiring them to do
anything new."'" There is particular concern that some of the companies
selected to join the Global Compact are inappropriate partners for the United
Nations, given their human rights record. 5 Moreover, some high-profile
NGO participants, like Pierre San6, the Secretary General of Amnesty
International, have called for independent monitoring within the Global
Compact structure.'6
There is doubtlessly a fair degree of opportunism and realism associated
with the Global Compact. I agree with many of the critiques proffered by
groups that advocate instead a "Citizens' Compact," particularly that legal
frameworks are important, and that governments and civil society should be
assisted to ensure compliance. While accepting those critiques, I argue
nonetheless that an initiative like the Global Compact holds the potential to
generate structured cosmopolitan dialogue, in three ways. First, the initiative
Nations. But neither is the Compact to be used as a corporate shield from criticism.") (last visited Apr. 16,
2001).
162. Id.
163. See SAssEN, LOSING CONTROL, supra note 109 (who juxtaposes the dramatic rise in economic
"citizenship" rights that MNEs have amassed with the decline incitizenship rights of natural persons). The
term "responsible citizenship" is also
used in Secretary-General of the United Nations,
Guidelines-Cooperation between the United Nations and the Business Community. 12(a) (June 17,2000),
available at http://www.un.org/partners/business/guide.htm (last visited June 16, 2001).
164. See Joseph Kahn, Multinationals Sign U.N. Pact on Rights and Environment, N.Y. TIMES, July
27,2000 at A3. See also Press Release, Global Compact-Groups Call for Suspension in Porto Alegre, Jan.
28, 2001, availableat http//www.corpwatch.org/globalization/un/papr.html (last visited May 8, 2001).
165. See Letter Says Global Compact Threatens UN Integrity, Letter to Secretary General Kofi Annan
from a wide range of civil society organizations, dated July 25, 2000, available at
http://www.corporatewatch.org/globalization/un/gcltr2.html (last visited May 8, 2001).
166. Id.
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holds the potential to ensure that the premier intergovernmental organization,
the United Nations, plays a participatory role in the development and shaping
of corporate governance. In an assessment of the aims and potential of the
Global Compact, two high-ranking UN officials argue that the Global
Compact "tries to enlist the business community in an advocacy role on behalf
of the UN."" 7 For the authors of the Global Compact, a United Nations that
is able to address labor, environmental, and human rights concerns in an
effective manner would fill a crucial global governance gap.' 8 Through the
Global Compact, the United Nations may do so while reinforcing the centrality
of internationally agreed upon standards. In the labor domain, the Global
Compact draws upon the ILO's fundamental principles and rights at work.
Additionally, it provides the space to collaborate constructively with the ILO
without being weighed down by the ILO's often burdensome structural
constraints.

Second, the Global Compact holds the potential to escape narrowly
corporatist notions of representation. It is able to engage major representatives
of labor" and business, who-so long as they are not complicit with human
rights abuses-should be present in these discussions. In this regard, it has the
potential to build a broad, tripartite plus framework. As an international
organization that has consistently increased the participation of civil society
in its activities, the United Nations has the legitimacy and the infrastructural
capacity to convene these groups on a broad range of concerns. But, the

United Nations needs to ensure that its deference of human rights remains
uncompromised, by ensuring that its role is merely to help corporations that
are prepared to engage in constructive action on labor rights, rather than
simply gaining financially from their public-relations oriented largesse.
Third, the Global Compact has real potential to refocus attention on the
issues faced by developing countries that prevent them from securing
167. See Georg Kell & John Gerard Ruggie, Global Markets and Social Legitimacy: The Case ofthe
'Global Compact,' Paper presented at an international conference, Governing the Public Domain Beyond
the Era of the Washington Consensus? Redrawing the Line Between the State and the Market, York
12, available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org
University, Toronto, Canada, Nov. 4.6, 1999
/gc/unweb.nsfcontent/gkJr.htm.
168. The authors also contend that if the UN were to be effective, it could also displace much of the
pressure on the world trading system to address these concerns. Id. The first paper in this trilogy would,
however, challenge that perspective. See generally Blackett, supra note 19.
169. This should logically include the International Trade Secretariats, in some cases at the forefront
of negotiating industry-level "framework agreements" to establish ongoing relationships with MNEs. See
Dwight W. Justice, The New Codes of Conduct and Social Partners, available at
http'//www.icftu.orgtdisplaydocument.aspIndex=991209382 (last visited June 1, 2001).
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fundamental principles and rights at work for the workers in their territory.
There are signs that this attention shift is already happening within the Global
Compact framework. At the July 2000 meeting discussed above, the
participants noted the importance of effective governance in promoting decent
work, and acknowledged the need for industrialized countries to play a role in
eradicating extreme poverty by opening their markets to developing countries'
exports, moving swiftly on debt relief, and increasing the volume and
effectiveness of official development assistance. 7 ' Yet, despite these
statements, the authors of the Global Compact seem able to resist (invariably
futile) totalizing impulses to eclipse existing self-regulatory initiatives,
however flawed. In other words, the Global Compact wisely does not try to
create an all-encompassing "code;" rather, it seeks only to coexist with
existing and future initiatives.
To harness the Global Compact's potential to highlight deeper structural
labor relations concerns, however, its implementors must take into account
three central correctives. First, the role of government in this approach must
be clarified and brought to the fore. Indeed, it might seem anachronistic that
any initiative taken by the United Nations should reflect such a conspicuous
absence of national governments. The Executive Summary of the meeting
discussed above lists a range of roles that the various business and civil society
groups can play, but contains only the standard statement that "[v]oluntary
initiatives of [this] kind ... are no substitute for action by governments."'' To
some extent, the involvement of the United Nations and its relevant specialized
agencies is enough to fill this void. Within their own constituencies, the
intergovernmental organizations have the ability and resources to ensure that
their memberships' concerns are well understood and represented.
Nevertheless, the respective organizations must consider how to ensure that
they are indeed speaking internationally to the representatives of government
that the MNEs encounter when they act transnationally (notably ministers of
foreign affairs and trade), as well as to the representatives of governments that
tend to be marginalized from these encounters (notably ministers of labor).
There may be moments when these representatives should be directly present
at meetings. On many other occasions, regular UN structures and those of the
170. See Global CompactMeeting, supranote 157, (Executive Summary andConclusion: Companies),
at http://www.un.orgtpartnersibusiness/gcevent/participantsC.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2001).
171. Id. at 6. See also Kahn, supra note 164 (quoting the Secretary-General of the LN, Kofi Annan,
who stated at a press conference that "Companies should not wait for governments to pass laws before they
pay a decent wage or agree not to pollute the environment. . . . If companies lead by example, the
governments may wake up and make laws to formalize these practices.").
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UN's specialized agencies should provide sufficient channels for expression.
Second, the Global Compact must retain the ability to craft flexible,
fluctuating representation. The list of participants in publicly announced
events thus far shows a bias in favor of large, institutionalized, Western NGOs
and corporations.
Despite terms in the guidelines that suggest that
corporations that are complicit in human rights abuses will not be eligible for
partnership, it is not apparent that any triage has been undertaken, and the
absence of a monitoring mechanism calls into question how this determination
can ultimately be made by the United Nations. Moreover, although one of the
stated (but apparently not yet realized) goals of the Global Compact is to enlist
a wide range of small corporations, there has been no such statement
concerning representatives of workers. But the exclusive focus on corporate
initiatives as they relate to the fundamental principles and rights at work calls
out for participation-in the specific places where MNE production
occurs-by those who can represent child workers, forced laborers, and
workers who face discrimination on grounds such as race, gender and level of
ability. While this comment does not necessarily challenge the occasional
"high level" meeting to discuss the initiative at a macro level, it does imply
that the legitimacy of the participatory forum is dependent on its ability
creatively to bring those most concerned into its fold. Doing so will require
sensitivity to the inevitable skepticism of some smaller NGOs of yet another
seemingly "top-down" initiative. Harnessing business input might entail
harnessing direct business funding to facilitate the participation of a constantly
fluctuating group of local and transnational actors. Obtaining corporate
funding would have to be done with the greatest care to ensure that the
financial input does not lead to a muting of criticism of the donor's corporate
activities. The United Nations, drawing on its many decentralized agencies
and its wide ability to distribute information and ensure that it is available
online, should be well placed to begin the consultative process of establishing
criteria and identifying the civil society organizations that might be most apt
to contribute.
Third and finally, the initiative must grapple with the specificity of labor
regulation. While there is a clear logic to dealing with a range of social
responsibility considerations together, as discussed earlier, labor is simply
different because of the relational dimensions of the workplace and the risk of
enlarging the scope of management power in a relationship of subordination.
To rethink the Global Compact might therefore entail being more methodical
about the way that the ILO's fundamental principles and rights at work are
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approached. Systematic attention to place is essential. The loose alliance with
the ILO should provide the resources to draw upon the expertise of industrial
relations specialists who have a broad enough vision to stray creatively from
traditional fordist regulatory approaches to consider creative approaches that
reflect the regulatory goals and pluralist nature of labor law in the new labor
market.
These correctives ultimately call for the development of a thickened
theoretical basis for the Global Compact-a basis that will support the
implementation of a more tailored set of conditions of participation on a
cosmopolitan governance model. These correctives also place considerable
faith in the ability of a carefully constructed participatory structure to develop
and to respond creatively to pressing labor regulatory concerns, once those
most concerned are at the table. A great virtue of the Global Compact is
precisely its willingness to accept the creation of space as a starting point.
CONCLUSION

I have argued in this Article that the flurry of current codes of corporate
conduct developed by MNEs, as well as the advocacy movements surrounding
them, warrant sustained theoretical analysis. Globalization, legal pluralism
and the decentered state have provided suitable lenses for the analysis. I have
suggested that the tendency of these codes to overlook the pluralistic
foundations of labor regulation, and their extension of unilateral management
power over particular places, is problematic. In addition, their challenge to
dominant conceptions of globalization is limited, as they reinforce certain
problematic asymmetries and entrench limited state regulatory action. Yet the
codes, and the advocacy they have generated, have shown the potential to open
up spaces for discussion-spaces that can be used to spotlight regulatory
deficits and to promote cosmopolitan democratic participation by
representative stakeholders in the labor context. These possibilities exist at
many levels, and a starting point at the international may already exist. The
United Nation's effort must be informed, however, by a thicker theoretical
understanding of what it means to create a fluid site for cosmopolitan
democratic participation that accounts for the specificity of labor regulation in
particular places. In this Article, I have analyzed these problems and provided
hints at how to begin to address them. Ultimately, though, I am content to rest
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with the wager that once the representational spaces are themselves opened up,
then this theoretical thickening will be attained as the complex particulars of
equitably re-regulating transnational workplaces are brought to light.

